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WJLK, NANCY GAYLE. Aesthetics of Sport: A Metacritical Analysis. (1977) 
Directed by: Dr. Celeste Ulrich. Pp. 144. 
This study attempted to analyze and synthesize the concepts of sport 
and metacritical aesthetics and to utilize that philosophical base from 
which to speculate on the nature of a metacritical aesthetic of sport. 
Tao complementary tools of philosophical research were utilized: "theory 
building" as described by Fraleigh (1970), and "analysis of the structure 
of k-nowledge" as developed by Gowin (1969). Fraleigh1 s design outlined 
steps or elements with which general and particular phenomena of interest 
are examined for consistency with and derivation from an existing phil­
osophic statement. Gowin's methodology, which suggested the positing of 
a series of telling and connecting questions to explore a philosophical 
concept, was utilized to identify the germinal issues. The philosophical 
and experimental literature of aesthetics and sport was examined to 
identify the major ideas and. concepts associated with the general phenom­
enon of interest, sport; the source philosophy, metacriticism; and with 
the particular phenomenon of interest, an aesthetic of sport. 
Beardsley's (1958) metacritical aesthetic theory was selected as the 
source philosophy. Critical reasoning about aesthetic experiences pre­
supposes general principals upon which judgments about particular experi­
ences deductively depend. Beardsley proposed the three elements of unity, 
intensity and complexity as the aesthetic-designating factors on which 
judgments about particular aesthetic experiences and works of art rely. 
The exhibition in sport of the aesthetic-designating factors comprises 
the conventional matrix which defines a metacritical aesthetic of sport. 
The findings of the study disclosed that sport exhibited the aes-
thetic-designating factors of unity, intensity and complexity as defined 
by the metacritical aesthetic theory. Sport, by the nature of the 
literature, was found to be properly designated as aesthetic activity. 
Uiis investigation has provided a germinal foundation for the concept, 
aesthetics of sport. From this base, additional study into philosophical, 
empirical and experimental concerns can be postulated with the assur­
ance that the fundamental issue of the existence of an aesthetics of 
sport has been explored. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The next area of development in physical education will, I 
believe, be in the aesthetic field (McCloy, 1940, p. 301). -
Thirty-five years is a long time to wait if you are supposed to be 
"next," but ultimately McCloy's prognosis regarding the future associa­
tion of physical education and aesthetics is coming to pass. The late 
1960's saw a surge of sport/art interest. Aestheticians and sports the­
orists alike began to explore the mutuality of their previously consid­
ered diverse fields. 
Thomas (1974), Lowe (1971, 1977), Fisher (1972), Anthony (1968), 
Keenan (1972), and Kovich (1971) are among the physical educators who 
have begun recently to explore the association of sport and the aes­
thetic. From the aestheticians come Saw (1971), Reid (1970), Hein (1969) 
and Kuntz (1974), who have looked at man's sport and play activities as a 
part of the aesthetic concern. Aesthetic awareness and evaluation in 
relation to sport ̂ s being considered with encouraging frequency in 
current professional and popular literature. 
These considerations are usually two-pronged and may be oriented 
either toward the performers' or audiences' viewpoint. Most of the lit­
erature deals with an examination of the feeling/aesthetic aspects of the 
performers' awareness. Authors explore "the perfect moment," "the peak 
experience" and the "... feeling of perfect rhythm, of timing, of per­
fection of technique that leads to intense joy of expression" (McCloy, 
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1940, p. 32). The performance or audience-oriented point of view is 
generally represented by discussions of empathic responses to sport 
situations and by critical descriptions of the movements in sport using 
the terminology of art and aesthetics: grace, beauty, power and mastery 
are words used in the appraisal of art and in the appraisal of sport. 
Maheu (1965) commenting on the correlation of art and sport, suggested, 
"In the action and rhythm which testify to mastery of space and time, 
sport becomes akin to the arts which create beauty" (p. 32). But the 
theoretical relationship between aesthetics and sport is assumed rather 
than explored in current literature. To date, the concept, "aesthetic 
of sport," has never been studied with the intent of justifying the 
existence of the assumption. As Lowe (1971) stated, "the question of 
what is the 'sport aesthetic' has been left unanswered far too long" 
(p. 16). 
The philosophical justification for an acceptance of the concept of 
a sport-aesthetic can be found in the literature of both aesthetics and 
sport. Each area of knowledge has led up to a conceptual merger of ideas 
but neither has crossed the border. This paper attempts to cross the 
boundary by relating the conceptual framework of metacritical aesthetic 
theory to the sport-philosophy literature dealing with the aesthetic/art 
aspects of sport. 
Play/Art/Aesthetic Concepts 
The historical precedent for the consideration of a sport-aesthetic 
can be found in the play/art/aesthetic concepts literature. Seward's 
(1944) projection of play as art was proposed as a refutation to a con­
sideration of the close relationship between play and art. He indicated 
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that many of the justifications for play such as preparation for life, 
surplus energy, catharsis, and imitation have been utilized also to jus­
tify art. He concluded that both are engaged in for the enjoyment of the 
activity. 
Seward contended that the form of play is important to the child 
and, therefore, the interest in play is esthetic rather than kinesthetic. 
He did admit a very close relationship between esthetic and kinesthetic 
interests and satisfactions but subscribed to the viewpoint that the form 
elements of play (boundaries, rules, etc.) made the esthetic more impor­
tant. Seward understood play and art as clarifying experience. The form 
elements of both promote order. 
It is true that in so far as play is recreation, it is escape. 
It is an escape from the relative chaos of ordinary experience 
to a world where there is a rational and moral order, plainly 
visible and not simply the object of faith. The play expe­
rience is, then, like art, a clarification of experience 
(Seward, 1944, p. 184). 
Schiller's (1968) classical play theory of art is germinal to this 
discussion. Schiller's doctrine of play indicated that aesthetic activ­
ity (referring to contemplation rather than creation) is the highest form 
of play. Man possesses a primary "play impulse" which synthesizes his 
sensuous (animal/material) nature and his formal (rational) nature. "In 
the play experience man's dual nature is harmonized and humanized" (Hein, 
1968, p. 67). Play is an inborn desire to create form out of impressions. 
Perhaps, as Schiller has said, man plays and engages in sport to 
give satisfaction to his creative imagination. He plays and 
moves and strives somehow in some way to build and create beauty 
(Parker, 1965, p. 80). 
To Schiller, the relationship between art and play was essentially 
genetic. Both are manifestations of the play impulse but art is a more 
mature or complex ("higher") form of play. 
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Hein's (1969) play aesthetic theory was similar to Schiller's. She 
saw the relationship between play and aesthetics but felt that Schiller's 
analysis was deficient in that it valued play, which was defined as spon­
taneous and intrinsically motivated, for the extrinsic value of aesthetic 
satisfactions. Hein indicated that this confusion of intrinsic and ex­
trinsic valuation weakened Schiller's position but that the premise of a 
basic relationship between the aesthetic and play was a sound one. 
Play is not exhaustively described as unreal, nor does the 
characterization apply to it alone. It is just the fact that 
it has this quality in common with aesthetic activity and, 
perhaps, with a number of other activities, that makes the 
project of exploring the one in terms of the other worth­
while (Hein, 1969, p. 28). 
Hein (1969) indicated that Schiller became too involved with the 
moral equivalency of play and aesthetic activity. This tended to obscure 
all other relationships which might be found. For this reason, Huizinga's 
(1972) non-instrumental definition of play was utilized by Hein in her 
analysis. 
The quality of unreality in play which Hein preferred to label 
"detachment from reality," is "the true bond between the playful and the 
aesthetic" (Hein, 1969, p. 70). Aesthetic contemplation may or may not 
be spontaneous or immediately pleasurable (all qualities found in play), 
but it does require an artificial distinction between the aesthetic ac­
tivity and an individual's ordinary sense of reality. This suspension of 
reality has been called "assuming the aesthetic attitude," but that is 
just a label. The important concept, according to Hein (1969), is that 
both play and aesthetic activity share the quality of unreality and that 
the long tradition of association between the two is well-founded. 
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Groos (1972) was also influenced by Schiller's analysis of play from 
the aesthetic standpoint. He believed that both play and aesthetic pleas­
ure are connected with sense perception and are genuine sources of enjoy­
ment. There are points of similarity between sense play and aesthetic 
enjoyment according to Groos. Both are perceptually oriented; they re­
quire the total absorption of the creator; technical skill is needed 
(here Groos extended his discussion to mention the technical side of 
sport); and both involve the seeking of recognition and appreciation 
(display). Groos saw art as being rooted in playful experimentation and 
imitation. 
Sadler (1969) saw play as a basic form of creativity and as a mode 
of forming one's personal world. He argued for a play theory which 
treats'play as a basic form of human behavior rather than a behavior 
pattern outgrown by adults. 
Certainly art and play interpenetrate in the struggle of 
imagination to become free; and both aid man in his search 
to rediscover the originality of his own existence and to 
see his world with a fresh new vision (Sadler, 1969, p. 67). 
Sport in Art 
Another justification for the consideration of a sport-aesthetic can 
be found in the utilization of sport activity as the subject matter of 
art. 
Sports writer Allison Danzig eloquently describes the bond 
between sport and art. "The alliance of art and sports is 
a natural one. The disciplined, rhythmic movements of the 
athlete—the flow of power in running a race, pulling an 
oar, throwing the discus, a baseball, or a football, swing­
ing a tennis racquet or a golf club, jabbing and feinting 
in the ring—are expressions in a different form of the 
beauty and enchantment of a fine painting or piece of 
sculpture" (Ingram, 1973, p. 24). 
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Artists have utilized sport as the subject matter of their art for 
thousands of years. According to Lipman (1957), the role of the human 
body in creative and appreciative experience has three aspects: as qual­
itative presence (body-image); as favored instrument of creative accom­
plishment; and as subject matter of the arts. 
From a mere thing, the body thus becomes an instrument, and 
from an instrument it becomes a medium and a primary subject-
matter of the arts (Lipman, 1957, p. 432). 
Ancient artists depicted athletic feats and events in their cave 
murals and in the decorations on practical, everyday objects. The Greeks 
and Romans glorified sport and its participants in their art. Myron's 
Discus Thrower and Appotenios1 The Seated Boxer are two famous examples 
of ancient attempts to capture and record the instant of peak action and 
the essence of excitement attendant to sport performances. 
Modern artists such as Thomas Eakins, Winslow Homer, R. Tait 
McKenzie, Joseph Brown, Pablo Picasso and Alexander Calder have turned 
their attention to sport. These artists have utilized a myriad of styles, 
techniques and art mediums to deal with sport subjects. 
Paintings, drawings, and sculptures can idealize or partic­
ularize the event that occurred, and while some artists tend 
to portray rigor and realism with photographic exactness, 
others present an abstraction of moving forms and figures. 
Descriptive artists can be categorized as social historians 
because their paintings depict life as it was in the past. 
Impressionistic artists suggest the quality of the movement: 
weightlessness, strength, beauty of motion, or mood of the 
action (Ingram, 1973, p. 26). 
Toynbee (1972) indicated that there are several reasons why sports 
activities are "a particularly sympathetic and stimulating source of 
inspiration to artists" (p. 305). The sport elements of balance, control 
and interrelated/interdependant patterns of action are qualities of 
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design which are valued by artists. The competitive themes of sport, by 
fostering intensity and complexity, provide the artist with unique and 
often unexpected patterns and designs. Toynbee described sport art as an 
opportunity to depict "the oldest and possibly most universally interest­
ing of all subject matter ..." (1972, p. 306)--the human body. The 
aesthetic possibilities of the human figure in action have absorbed 
artists for ages. Sport, with its emphasis on the body, offers almost 
unlimited possibilities and themes. 
The extent of the relationship between sport and art can further be 
demonstrated by the establishment in 1968 of the National Art Museum of 
Sport in New York City (Ingram, 1973) . The museum has a permanent col­
lection of sculpture, drawings and paintings and has even commissioned 
artists to create new works for the collection. 
The American Alliance for Health, Physical Education and Recreation 
and the National Art Education Association have recognized the art and 
sport commonalities through the preparation in 1969 of the filmstrip, 
Art and Sport. The more than fifty color slides of art works covers 
ancient to modern times and is accompanied by an audiotape which was 
designed to enhance the perception of the viewer. The purpose of Art and 
Sport was to bring attention to the bond between art and sport and to 
demonstrate "just how moving is beauty and how beautiful is movement" 
(AAHPER and NAEA, 1968) . 
Statement of the Problem 
This study was designed to analyze and synthesize the instrumental 
and institutional concepts of metacritical aesthetics and to utilize this 
as a basis for speculation on the nature of a metacritical aesthetic of 
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sport. The delineation of philosophical theory concerning the nature of 
an aesthetic of sport was examined for concepts consistent with current 
metacritical theory. 
Method and Design 
This study has utilized two complementary types of philosophical 
research: "theory building" as described by Fraleigh (1970), and "analysis 
of the structure of knowledge" as developed by Gowin (1969a). The pro­
cedural design followed Fraleigh1s format and the method of inquiry 
utilized Gowin1s telling and connecting questions. 
Fraleigh's (1970) design for theory building is an "examination of a 
particular phenomenon in terms and structures consistent with and derived 
from an existing philosophic statement" (p. 30). The steps or elements 
of theory building are flexible enough to permit their application to 
widely differing research problems. For the purposes of this study, 
those described by Fraleigh (1970) were used. 
The elements which were used are as follows: 
1. choosing the general phenomenon of interest. In the case of 
this study, the general phenomenon is sport. 
2. selection of a facet of the phenomenon for extensive study. The 
particular phenomenon of interest is the aesthetic of sport. 
3. selection, description and explanation of the source philosophy. 
The researcher chose the interrelated instrumental and institutional 
theories of Beardsley (1958) and Dickie (1971, 1974). 
4. relating the philosophy to the specific phenomenon of interest. 
Sport was examined to see if any characteristics were consistent with the 
aesthetic-designating factors of the source theories. 
\ 
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Gowin's (1969a) method for the analysis of the structure of knowl­
edge was used to collate the phenomenon of sport and the philosophical 
positions of Beardsley (1958) and Dickie (1971, 1974). 
Gowin's (1969a) method for the analysis of structure of knowledge 
employs the use of a series of telling and connecting questions to ex­
plore a philosophical concept. The telling questions lie at the crux of 
the inquiry and, by their nature, prompt the formation of other ques­
tions. These other connecting questions, of a secondary nature, are 
important to the answering of the telling questions. "That there are a 
number of connected or secondary questions with answers indicates that 
there is a structure of knowledge consisting of these interrelationships" 
(Gowin, 1969a, p. 3). 
Telling and connecting questions were identified to define the 
statement of the problem. These questions focused on the central con­
cerns of aesthetics, sport and their interrelationship(s). 
Telling Questions Is there an aesthetic of sport? 
Connecting Questions: A. What is aesthetics? 
B. What factors designate an object as a 
candidate for appreciation? 
1. What examples can be found which dem­
onstrate the utilization of these factors? 
G. What is sport? 
D. What factors designate an activity as 
sport? 
1. What examples can be found which dem­
onstrate the utilization of these factors? 
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Telling Question: Can an aesthetic of sport be defined? 
Connecting Questions: A. What aesthetic-designating factors are 
exhibited by sport? 
1. What examples can be found which dem­
onstrate the utilization of these factors? 
B. Is the exhibition of these factors central 
or peripheral to sport? 
1. What examples can be shown to dem­
onstrate the central or peripheral nature 
of these factors? 
Telling Question: Can sport be classified relative to the aesthetic? 
Connecting Questions: A. Is there variability in the exhibition of 
aesthetic-designating factors? 
1. What examples can be shown to dem­
onstrate this variability? 
B. Is there variability in the visibility of 
these factors? 
1. What examples can be shown to dem­
onstrate this variability? 
Telling Question: Can a paradigm be formulated for an aesthetic of 
sport? 
The philosophical and experimental literature of aesthetics and 
sport was examined to identify the major ideas and concepts associated 
with the general phenomenon of interest, sport; the source philosophy, 
metacriticism; and with the particular phenomenon of interest, an aes­
thetic of sport. 
Definition of Terms 
For the purpose of this study, the set of definitions prepared by 
Gowin (1969b) for use in philosophical inquiry were utilized. 
Assumption "statement or proposition upon which other 
statements may depend. Something taken for 
granted, a supposition. Not tested although 
it could be converted into a hypothesis for 
testing" (p. 1). 
Presupposition 
Concept 
Conceptual System 
"assumption made in advance, a necessary ante­
cedent condition in logic or fact" (p. 1). 
"sign of an invariance in a situation, . . . 
a theoretical construct, an abstract idea" 
(p. 1). 
"set of concepts logically related" (p. 1). 
Philosophical Theory "cluster of problems with family resemblances" 
(p. 3). 
Principle 
Telling Questions 
"statement which points out the key features 
of given phenomena which, if known correctly, 
is a guide to the action of the thing or 
phenomena" (p. 3). 
"question which when asked seems to suggest 
other questions: it tells one what to ask 
next. It is a leading question . . ." (p. 3). 
Connecting Questions "secondary questions with answers indicating 
that there is a structure of knowledge con­
sisting of these interrelationships" (p. 3). 
Assumptions 
The underlying assumptions of this study were basically those for 
theory-building research defined by Fraleigh (1970). They were partic­
ularized for this inquiry. 
1. That the particular aesthetic theories utilized are valid; 
2. That instrumental and institutional aesthetic theories are 
appropriate philosophical positions from which to interpret sport; 
3. That the researcher has an adequate background in the areas of 
aesthetics and sport theory and an accurate and adequate grasp of the 
basic tenets of the aesthetic and sport concepts under consideration. 
Limitations of the Study 
This study was limited to an analysis of sport interpreted in rela­
tion to metacritical aesthetic theory. 
The language of aesthetics is often highly specific and obscure. 
The "sense" of words is seldom identified and, therefore, confusion in 
the use of terminology is often found. "Art" and "aesthetics" are two 
terms which exchange descriptive and evaluative senses almost as often 
as they are used. This study was limited to the author's ability to 
discern the correct sense of aesthetic terminology. 
An additional delimitation is characteristic of all philosophical 
research and involves availability of literature, selection and inter­
pretation of that literature and the writer's capacity to demonstrate 
logically derived relationships within the problem. 
Significance of the Study 
Philosophy and theory building have enjoyed both significance and 
meaning throughout recorded history. Aesthetics, as a recognized branch 
of philosophy, is relatively new. Sport theory can also be considered a 
noviate in the theoretical conjectures regarding activity patterns. An 
initial investigation into the possible interrelationships between aes­
thetics and sport could be significant if it provided a foundation from 
which other studies could proceed. Without a philosophical base or the­
oretical assurance, the concept of an aesthetic of sport is irrational 
and, therefore, virtually unjustified. 
This study has provided a germinal foundation for a concept which 
has become increasingly significant and meaningful to many sport the­
orists and aestheticians. From this base, additional study into philo­
sophical, empirical and experimental concerns can be postulated with the 
assurance that the fundamental issue of the existence of an aesthetic of 
sport has been explored. 
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CHAPTER II 
WHAT IS SPORT? 
The purpose of a definition is to identify, to explain the nature 
of, to specify the essential qualities of something. When the question 
"What is . . . ?" is asked, the questioner is generally seeking an essen­
tial definition. The purpose of such a definition is to describe the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of the thing to be defined. Allow­
ance must be made to include all members of the class to be defined and 
care must be taken to exclude all which is not a member. An essential 
definition implies that there is that point at which can be drawn the 
line which says: That belongs and that does not. This can happen, accord­
ing to Weitz (1970), only in logic, mathematics or in the sciences in 
which the concepts are constructed and are completely defined. In the 
fields which deal with empirically descriptive and normative concepts, 
the necessary and sufficient conditions cannot be stipulated unless the 
range of use of the concept being defined is arbitrarily closed. This 
arbitrary closing of the range of use of a concept is called, in empirical 
research, an operational definition. The definition is then specific to 
the situation and the use to which it is applied. 
Historically, when philosophers (in whatever field) proposed a 
definition, their fellow theorists would examine the definition critically 
for loopholes and fallacious or circular thinking. Semantic analysis 
"proved" the worth or worthlessness of the definition. Rigorous 
inspection followed by an essay denouncing the definition as somehow 
inadequate was the general pattern until Wittgenstein proposed his doc­
trine of family resemblances. This theory circumvents the traditional 
objections to a proposed definition by indicating that there are no 
clear-cut necessary and sufficient conditions to define concepts. All 
those entities to which are applied a common name (like sport or art) do 
not necessarily possess any one or two features in common. They may be 
related through the crisscrossing and overlapping of resembling features. 
A problem arises with the doctrine of family resemblances when one tries 
to limit the application of a given word. 
Some balance must be established between the strictness of essential 
definitions and the looseness of open-textured, family resemblance-type 
explanations or definitions. This balance is sought with the demonstra­
tion of relationships among operationally defined subconcepts. This 
balance is partially found in contextual definitions. The definitions 
of "What is art?" and "What is sport?" are derived from what they are 
(structurally and organizationally) and by what they "do" (to the 
creator/participant and to the audience/critic/spectator). 
Both art and sport are extremely complex and abstract concepts. 
Attempts to define them date back to their inceptions. Both are known 
to practically everyone but neither have been defined to anyone's com­
plete satisfaction. Each succumbs to Kennick's (1968) "warehouse 
theory." Ask a friend to go into a warehouse and bring out all the art 
or sport objects and he will do so. Then ask him to get all the objects 
which display "significant form," "organic unity," "competition," or 
"alea" and he will return empty-handed and baffled. He knows what a 
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sport or art object looks like, but does not know what to look for when 
told to retrieve objects which possess "symbolic transformation" or which 
display "agon." 
It can be contended that if the obtuse terms were defined or if the 
context of their usage were explained, then our friend would have the 
same success regardless of the wording of the task directions. This 
paper will attempt to define the terms "sport" and "aesthetics" with 
such clarity. 
Numerous authors, when writing about sport, play, games and ath­
letics, do not define the context of their terminological usage. The 
word, "sport," is applied to a variety of situations. Each application 
is specific to a context of usage and that context is often understood 
only after careful reading and interpretation. Suits' (1973) sport is 
Kent's (1975) game; Weiss' (1969) sport is Kent's (1975) athletics; and 
Loy's (1968) multiple definition of sport encompasses most of the current 
usages. It is up to the individual reader to discern the particular 
"meaning" of an author's terminology. Only by careful inspection can the 
various sport theorists and theories be differentiated and defined. 
Few would deny that the experiencing of sport has effects on both 
the performers and the spectators involved. In fact, involvement is the 
key to the affective response to sport. Some authors, in their defini­
tional efforts, choose to look at what they consider to be the basic 
nature of sport: its organizational and structural pattern. By describ­
ing the readily apparent aspects of sports, they indicate that it is the 
structure and organization which allow sport activities to be identified 
as different from other patterns of behavior. Other theorists see the 
"center" or definitive issue of what is or is not sport in relation to 
the responses and involvement of the performers and spectators. They do 
not deny structure and organization, but they indicate by their extension 
of the concept of sport, that the interactional patterns of behavior are 
germinal to the meaning of sport. A third group of sport definitions can 
also be identified. These more complex definitional efforts attempt to 
combine the previously described emphases, structure and involvement, 
with varying degrees of success. 
Structural/Organizational Definitions 
The structural/organizational definitions can be introduced with the 
anthropologist's answer to the "What is sport?" question (Leonard, 1975). 
Sport is designated as organized play which involves competition among 
two or more sides. There are criteria to determine a winner and the 
pattern of play must follow agreed-upon (by the participants) rules. 
Metheny (1969) posed the problem to her students to differentiate 
between those activities called sport and those which are called some­
thing else. They tried to identify a set of characteristics common to 
all types of sport activities (an essential definition). Metheny1s 
definition of sport, then, refers to a diverse set of activities or 
organizations of human behavior which involve at least one performer who 
moves within a specific environment with the objective being to bring 
about overt changes in the locations or appearance of specified animals, 
objects and/or other persons. These actions are governed by concocted 
rules or agreements which specify the allowable procedures. A stasis, 
chaos, stasis rhythm is developed with the contest whereby after each 
attempt to achieve the objective, the performers return to their initial 
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positions. Some typical patterns involve solo, side-by-side, parallel 
and face-to-face performances. The values a person might find in expe­
riencing sport are not considered in this definitional effort. 
Suits' (1973) definition of sport is a game which involves physical 
skill and which has a fairly stable, wide following. A game has a goal, 
the means for achieving the goal, both constitutive and skill rules and 
an acceptance of the rules by the participants. "Playing a game is the 
voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles" (Suits, 1973, p. 55). 
Sport, to Suits might best be expressed as "popular sport." 
Loy (1968) defined sport in relation to the various planes of dis­
course utilized in the reference to the concept. Consideration of sport 
as an institutionalized game and as a social institution are essentially 
structural definitions. The institutionalized game plan treats sport in 
relation to its degree of organization. Teams, sponsorship, norms and 
sanctions set sport apart from other concepts. Sport requires technology 
the intrinsic elements involving equipment, physical skills of players, 
knowledge of the rules; and the extrinsic elements associated with facil­
ities, and the skills and knowledges of support and coaching personnel. 
Sport also has a symbolic sphere including elements of secrecy, ritual 
and display. Lastly, the physical skills of sport are transmitted 
through formal instruction. Sport is institutionalized; games are not. 
Loy (1968) extended the notion of sport as an institutional pattern 
to a consideration of sport as a social situation. Sport is so perva­
sive that its magnitude qualifies it for designation as an institution. 
Sport as a social institution refers to the sport order. All organiza­
tions in society, whether primary, technical, managerial or corporate, 
19 
which organize, assist or regulate human action in sport situations 
comprise the sport order. This view of sport is broader than the view 
of sport as an institutional game. 
Summary. The organizational/structural definitions see sport as 
involving skilled human patterns of play occurring within spatial, tem­
poral and organizational limits. Each has different aspects of sport on 
Which it focuses, but all include the definitive factors of space and 
time use and organizational patterns. (See Appendix A.) 
Interactional Definitions 
The interactional or psychologically-centered definitions focus on 
what happens to the performers or the audience. They generally begin 
with the common factors from the structural definitions but they go much 
farther and center their emphasis on the affective behavior patterns. 
For this reason, it is somewhat harder to discern commonalities among 
these definitions. 
Huizinga's (1972) play theory is germinal to many of the inter­
actional definitions. He postulated that play is free and voluntary; it 
is outside ordinary life into the intense and absorbing "only pretending" 
life; it has rules and spatial and temporal boundaries and is ordered 
within its sphere of influence. Play has tension brought on by uncer­
tainty of outcome and promotes the formation of cohesive groups who cloak 
themselves with secrecy to highlight their "difference" to those not in 
the group. Huizinga saw play as being on the opposite end of a long 
continuum from work. 
Caillois (1972) looked at games in an effort to satisfactorily 
classify them. He despaired of other classification systems which 
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designated differences in relation to who played or where play was held 
or what implements were used. Caillois felt that many game activities 
may employ several of these classifications and several very different 
games can be played in the same spatial boundaries or by the same players 
or with the same implements. Caillois concluded that the attitudes of 
the players should be the classifying factor. 
He proposed four original principles, each of which dominates yet 
interacts with the others. Competition (agon), chance (alea), simulation 
(mimicry) and vertigo (ilinx) are designated as the four main rubrics. 
Within these divisions, game behavior occurs on a continuum from free 
improvisation (paida) to total discipline (ludus). 
Luschen (1967) indicated that sport is interactional activity which 
is both rational and playful. The rewards earned through participation 
are extrinsic and, as the rewards become greater, the more the players 
"work" at the sport. He obviously saw sport involvement on a continuum 
somewhere between work and play. 
Loy's (1968) consideration of sport as a social situation involves 
the social context within which individuals interact. The distinctions 
among sport situations are decided on the basis of the degree and kind of 
interactional involvement. Two kinds of involvement (producers and con­
sumers) and three degrees of involvement (primary, secondary and ter­
tiary) allow all sport interactions to be classified. The players are 
primary producers and the coaches and officials occupy a secondary role. 
The primary consumers are those who see the contest "live"; the secondary 
consumer is involved through mass media; and the person who reads about 
the outcome is a tertiary or vicarious consumer. 
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Loy does not mention it, but an individual could, within the tem­
poral confines of one contest, take several roles. A cheering bench-
warmer who periodically dons the spotter's earphones would cross from 
primary consumer to secondary producer. When he gets into the game, he 
then becomes a primary producer and acts out his real reason for being 
there. 
Another view of sport is offered by Dunning (1967) in a paper 
intended to demonstrate that sport is not "unreal" or "irreal" but is 
real because the sporting behavior is overt and clearly observable. He 
sought his definition in a sociological analysis and saw the function of 
sport being to provide a pleasurable tension-excitement. This is accom­
plished by a group configuration characterized by the level of involve­
ment of the players and spectators and the degree of equality among 
opposing players in terms of skills and strengths. The rules of the 
contest are designed to reduce arbitrary advantages caused by environ­
mental conditions and the outcome must be uncertain. The rules or organ­
ization of a sport situation are often changed to maintain or restore the 
dynamic tension-balance. Official rule changes which point this out are 
the designated hitter in baseball, the tie-break procedure in tennis and 
the 30-secoiid clock in basketball. Organizational changes are generally 
less formal and are clearly shown when players are "swapped" from one 
team to another to make the competition more equal and when the rules are 
"bent" to allow for the skill level or the number of participants. 
Mcintosh (1968) classified sport in relation to the motives and 
satisfactions which sport gives. He did not look at the activity itself. 
Mcintosh utilized the three concepts of competition, combat and conquest 
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to differentiate among the various sport situations. Physical activity 
which does not involve one of these three concepts is placed in a rather 
nebulous expressive/communicative area. He expressed succinctly the 
dilemma of the theorists who look at sport from a sociological or inter­
actional point of view: 
Sport, then, touches human life at many points--so many that 
it is difficult to define the concept or set limits to sport­
ing activity (p. 10). 
Jeu (1972) asked the question "What is sport?" and followed with an 
interesting, if rambling, discussion of the various "things" sport is. 
He utilized a tri-level theory to define sport. His initial assumption 
was that sport is both physically and emotionally exertive. On the first 
level of his.theory, sport is a free (in the Huizinga sense), open-air 
activity involving competition and requiring a systematic effort to 
discipline the body. The second level explains that sport allows com­
munity with nature and it allows man to overcome his natural heaviness 
and to free himself from any felt alienation from his body. Competitive 
sport, according to Jeu, adds the confrontation with the other both with­
in the self and with others. 
The third stage of the definition deals specifically with the com­
petitive aspect of sport. Sport is tragedy, mastery of self before 
mastery of an opponent, self-determination in relation to freely choosing 
the sport and adopting its rules, and cooperation before competition. 
Jeu indicated that, "The principle which brings individuals together in 
sport is the will to fight." There must be an agreement to compete or 
there is no contest. 
Jeu made an interesting point in differentiating between sport and 
game: 
Thus sport favours science and law; the game, by contrast, 
remains in the domain of instability and fantasy: it finishes 
as it begins, to the delight of everyone. Lastly, sport dif­
fers from the game in so far as it takes the game seriously 
(p. 155). 
Additionally, game depends on chance and external forces and sport is 
anti-chance. In sport, the outcome is predicted because of the per­
formers, not because of external causes. Within the discussion of sport, 
Jeu designated the heart of sport to be the feature of tragedy. "Tragedy 
in sport opposes two finite selves each of which wants to impose its 
infinite will upon the other" (p. 162). The outcome is uncertain and 
dynamic tension and intensity are built by the opposition of will. 
Slusher's (1967) existential sport is serious, centered around the 
physical body and communal. Being is both the object and goal in his 
explanation of the individual's involvement in sport. In a sport situa­
tion, man is both the mover and the moved. Sport has rules and regula­
tions, it has ritual, and it is a social institution. The center or 
spirit of the concept, to Slusher, lies with four factors: contention of 
interest which involves commitment and rules-determined outcomes, con­
sistency of role carrying a need for individual and group decision­
making, utilization-actualization involving "... maximization of indi­
vidual effort toward utilitarian ends" (p. 47), and variable 
predictability which indicates that the controlling variables in 
sport cannot be predicted but those in games can. This last factor 
provides the differentiation between sport and game. 
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Summary. All of these interactional definitions discuss the involve­
ment and competitive aspects of sport. They begin with an acceptance of 
the physical, bodily nature of the activities and center their theories 
in the degree and/or kind of involvement among the individuals in the 
sport situations. (See Appendix A.) 
Complex/Combinational Definitions 
Several sport theorists have utilized complex, combinational defini­
tions to "explain" sport. They describe the structural/organizational 
features and then go on to concern themselves with the interactional 
affects. This straddling of the structure vs. affect fence could be 
construed as a theoretical weakness but the author does not see it as 
such in the theories described below. Rather than shifting the focus 
between two "centers," which would weaken the arguments, most of these 
theorists have broadened central concepts to include both structural/ 
organizational and interactional features. 
Weiss' (1969) structural description indicated that sport is a rule-
governed bodily adventure which has boundaries, strategies and tactics. 
The other aspect of his explanation postulated that man engages in sport 
to seek excellence and completion of self. This striving for perfection 
and selfhood explains why people train and compete when to do so often 
involves pain, deprivation, discouragement and failure. His theory is 
somewhat unique in that he applied it directly to athlete and spectator 
alike. Most theorists discuss the spectator's involvement only in an 
incidental way. 
According to Kenyon (1974), sport is "institutionalized, competitive, 
gross physical activity. Its major elements are its form, its 
participants, its facilitators, and the situation in which it occurs" 
(p. 20). The form of sport includes its goals and rules (explicit form) 
and its acquired characteristics and rituals (implicit form) . The par­
ticipants are the players and spectators. The sport situation possesses 
both physical and social aspects. Leadership, arbitration and commerce 
are the outside facilitation factors which are necessary for the sport 
activity to be operational. Like Loy (1968), Kenyon allowed for differ­
ing degrees and kinds of involvement with the sport situation. For 
instance, participation or facilitation could be either primary/direct 
or it could be secondary/peripheral. 
Loy's (1968) explanation of sport as a game occurrence was both 
involved and analytical. He began with the basic elements of Huizinga 
and Caillois. Sport is playful, free, uncertain, unproductive, rule-
governed and "only pretend." The elements of competition and physical 
prowess imply the dynamic tension and ascetic factors present in sport. 
The final element involved the presence and interaction among physical 
skill, strategy and chance. The outcome of most sports is determined 
by a combination of at least two of these factors. Often the factor of 
chance is utilized through the rules to assure equal opportunities con­
cerning temporal and environmental features. Loy differentiated between 
games and sport on the basis of the skill demands of the activities. 
Sports require practice and learning to attain the necessary proficiency 
games generally utilize a minimum of physical skill. A. borderline area 
is described by Loy; he suggested, in such peripheral instances, that a 
difference be defined in terms of the degree of organization or the in­
stitutionalization of the activity. Sport is more highly organized and 
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has a tradition and a past and has guidelines for the future. 
Torkildsen (1967) saw sport as a complexity. It has, like art, 
diverse meanings. "Sport, like art, is viewed differently by different 
people; it has many sides to its nature" (p. 65). Sport is associated 
with the related concepts of play, games, physical activity, leisure and 
recreation. Sports are structured, organized and rule-governed activ­
ities involving gross human movement. They are characterized by com­
petition and are manifest in games, both physically active and relatively 
passive; in contests (athletic, conquest and transportation); and in 
active and organized recreation. Sport, according to Torkildsen, can 
be viewed both as an institution in society and as a domain of human 
activity. It is non-utilitarian, competitive and ordered. 
Vanderzwaag (1972) related sport to three other concepts: play, 
games and athletics. Sport is an extension of play which is marked by 
spatial and temporal boundaries. It is ruled, competitive activity 
which includes the demonstration of physical prowess. Athletics is a 
more highly structured and organized extension of sport. Most of 
Vanderzwaag's concept of sport can be pictured on a continuum: 
play 4 sport f athletics 
4 games • 
Games are a variety of play; they are found in sport; and 
they are an essential ingredient in athletics. . . . This 
[continuum] conveys the idea that games are found in play, 
sport, and athletics. The nature of games changes as one 
moves from play to sport to athletics (p. 72). 
According to Vanderzwaag (1970), many key concepts have been asso­
ciated with sport. Some of the more prominent include sportsmanship, 
sports appreciation, creativity in sport, competition, play, games, 
exercise, physical education, culture and the human movement phenomenon. 
Most of these have been, at one time or another, the most important 
phenomenon either associated with or subsumed under sport. Vanderzwaag 
allied sport with play, games and athletics. 
Kent (1975) examined the conceptual framework of all of the above 
definitions and sought to identify their commonalities. In this way, she 
arrived at a succession of definitions relating play, game, sport and 
athletics. Each concept is separately constructed in relation to the 
common features found in older definitions. Each is predicated on the 
framework of the preceeding concepts and a continuum from play to ath­
letics is apparent. Her definitions have utilized reduction reasoning. 
Play is a voluntary behavior, regulated by orderly and sep­
arate temporal and spatial designs, which is indifferent to 
material interest. 
Game is a pattern of play, dictated by a prescribed, goal-
oriented, system of action, which may use material compensa­
tion to encourage future involvement. 
Sport is a pattern of game, governed by a history and a pre­
scribed system of physical, goal-oriented, action which may 
offer material compensation to reward excellence and/or to 
encourage future involvement. 
Athletics is a pattern of sport which is rigid in governance 
and offers material compensation to reward excellence (Kent, 
1975, p. 1). 
Sport, being a pattern of game, includes the elements of play and 
game. The presence of history and the potential for material gain dif­
ferentiate sport from game. Athletics, then, becomes a more rigidly 
governed and more amply rewarded pattern of sport. In much of the lit­
erature utilized in this study, the authors selected used the term 
"sport" when they were referring to the activities that Kent would call 
"game," "sport" or "athletics." 
Kent's definition does not forbid the application of all three terms 
to particular activities. Volleyball is a game 'when "infinity volley­
ball" is played. This game involves everyone who wants to participate 
cooperating to keep the ball in play. The official rules are followed 
with one major exception: the "score" is the number of consecutive con­
tacts by both teams and is shared by all players. Volleyball is sport in 
most physical education class situations and it is definitely athletics 
at the national and international levels of competition. 
Singer (1976), in a discussion of sport and sport science, like 
Kent, utilized a family resemblances-type of definition. Play, games, 
physical recreation, physical education and sport are terms which define 
a "conceptual family." Sport is the center of the concept and games are 
the predominant form of sport. 
Sport is a human activity that involves specific administrative 
organization and a historical background of rules which define 
the objective and limit the pattern of human behavior; it in­
volves competition or challenge and a definite outcome primarily 
determined by physical skill (p. 28). 
The various levels of organization which are seen in sport can be 
differentiated by the modifier which precedes them: intercollegiate, 
professional, natural, intramural. Game, as the major form of sport, is 
seen by Singer, as: 
activities with an agreed-upon organization of time, space and 
terrain, and rules that define the objective and limit the 
pattern of human behavior; the outcome, which is to determine 
a winner and a loser, is achieved by totaling or accumulating 
objectively scored points or successes (p. 31). 
This definition of game excludes gymnastics, figure skating, ski 
jumping, diving and synchronized swimming as games due to the subjective 
aspects of their scoring. Games and sports may overlap but some sports 
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cannot be games (gymnastics) and some games may not be sports (checkers). 
Singer proposed a set of five interlocking circles as the model for 
his "family of concepts" definitions. Sport is at the center. 
Physical 
Education 
Physical > 
Recreation 
Sport 
Play Games 
Singer's family concept definition of sport, by its development and 
organization, is "essential" enough to exclude nonsport and is flexible 
enough to allow, as sport, most of the newer, nontraditional physical 
activities which are currently being played in the name of sport. 
Summary. The combinational and continuum-oriented definitions of 
sport are more effective in pinpointing "What is Sport?" than are the 
single-centered structural or interactional explanations. They utilize 
the common features of each center and, thereby, expand the application 
of the definitions to include many differing sport activities. The com­
monalities among these more complex definitions begin with structure and 
expand to include relational/involvement concepts (see Appendix A). 
The definition of sport which is utilized for this paper is a 
synthesis of the previous group of sport definitions. The germinal 
aspects of all the definitions were considered and the following defini­
tion of sport broadens the concept to allow for the inclusion of the 
widely differing manifestations of the thing called sport. 
Sport is physical, playful, bounded, rule-governed and competitive/ 
challenging activity. It offers opportunities for social interaction and 
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for the pursuit of personal and group excellence. It is dynamic, tense, 
absorbing and potentially fulfilling. Sport is related to play, games 
and athletics. Differentiation among these four concepts is not readily 
apparent but the degree and institutionalization of organization offers 
a means of discrimination. 
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CHAPTER III 
WHAT IS AESTHETICS? 
Aesthetics is variously conceived as the philosophy or sci­
ence of beauty (as by Santayana, 1896), as the philosophy or 
science of art (as by Parker, 1920), and as the philosophy 
of criticism (as by Beardsley, 1958) (Sparshott, 1963, p. 57). 
The term "aesthetics" was coined by Baumgarten, a German philosopher, 
in the eighteenth century. The original meaning referred to a theory of 
sensuous knowledge formulated as a counterpart to logic as a theory of 
intellectual knowledge. 
The field of aesthetics is characteristically diffuse and unsys­
tematic. It has no clearly delineated boundaries or directions and, 
therefore, there is no history of consistent organization of the the­
oretical approaches or ventures in this area. The variety of methods 
utilized in aesthetic inquiry reflect the complexity of analytical ap­
proaches . 
Experimental psychologists have used rank ordering, paired compar­
isons and absolute judgments to determine the aesthetic preferences of 
individual subjects. The work of Barron and Welsh (1952) and Eisenman 
(1964; 1966), dealing with preferences for visual complexity, and that 
of Child (1962; 1964), concerned with preferencing as an expression of 
aesthetic sensitivity, are notable. The work of Beardsley (1958), 
Santayana (1896), Ziff (1959) and Weitz (1970) in analytical philosophy 
have sought to clarify the language used in art criticism. 
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Published dialogues, discussions and disagreements among aesdiet­
icians constitute the major work in analytical aesthetics. As soon as a 
theory is proposed, it is critically examined for circularity or falla­
cious reasoning. Few, if any, theories completely survive the dissec­
tion. Kaelin's (1962) research in existential psychology and phenom-
enological aesthetics has contributed to aesthetic education by utilizing 
the epoche technique of Husserl to "bracket out" all the non-phenomenal 
characteristics of the appearance of any object (its species, the causes 
of its existence, etc.) to get at the essence of the object itself. This 
qualitative evaluation seeks to distinquish relevant from irrelevant 
statements about the nature of aesthetic objects. Experimental psychol­
ogy, analytical philosophy and existential psychology are widely diverse 
areas which have applied their various research methods to examine the 
field of aesthetics. 
The definition and usage of the terms "art" and "aesthetics" has 
changed consistently from period to period and from theory to theory. 
The study of art in the classical period of Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus 
was the study of life. The narrow sense of art as "fine art" was then 
unknown. Science and art were not clearly differentiated until art was 
divorced from science in the eighteenth century and the science of 
artistic perception was "created." Aesthetics has been separated grad­
ually from other philosophic disciplines and it has become more isolated 
from everyday life. 
As an axiologic subdiscipline of philosophy, aesthetics concerns 
itself with the nature and significance of art, with the evaluation and 
value assessment of art objects and with the concept of "the beautiful." 
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This concern with "the beautiful," in terms of written material, at least 
dates back to Plato and Aristotle. Art as manufacture and craft gave way 
to the classical themes of art as beauty, art as appearance and art as 
imitation. These ideas lacked systematic and elaborate conceptual devel­
opment but were (and are) used as the building blocks to formulate modern 
aesthetic theories (Kristeller, 1970). 
Some major philosophical issues in aesthetics concern beauty, taste 
and the nature of the aesthetic experience. Osterhoudt (1973) expanded 
these concerns to include: 
the metaphysical status of the arts; the form, content, and 
subject matter of the arts; the criteria of aesthetic judge­
ment (criticism); . . . the role of intellectuality (contem­
plation) and emotionality (feeling) in the arts; the nature 
of aesthetic experience and pleasure; the relation of the art 
product (work of art) to the process by which it is created; 
. . . the role of the artist, performer and the audience in 
the arts ... (p. 303). 
The ultimate issue which encompasses all of the above concerns is to 
define the range of expression in the arts. In aesthetics, attempts are 
made to clarify the basic concepts employed in thinking and talking about 
the objects of aesthetic experience and to answer certain questions 
within which these concepts are embedded. Four central questions are 
germane to analysis: 
1. What is art?— 
2. What is the nature of a work of art?-
3. What is (are) the purpose(s) of art?. 
4. What is good art? 
definitive concerns 
valuational concerns 
All aesthetic theories, with varying degrees of success, ultimately 
address themselves to these questions. 
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A work of art or aesthetic experience involves three entities: a 
creator (artist), an object (event) and a perceiver (audience/critic). 
Hein (1970) indicated that the aesthetic situation has three essential 
components: the artist, the work of art and the appreciator. To facil­
itate the presentation of representative theories, Hein's (1970) organ­
ization of categories into which basic issues of aesthetics are placed 
will be used. 
Various theories can be categorized relative to where they place the 
central focus of their concern. 
Before the eighteenth century, beauty was a central concept; 
during the century, it was replaced by the concept of taste; 
by the end of the century, the concept of taste had been 
exhausted and the way was open for the concept of the aes­
thetic (Dickie, 1971, p. 32). 
A consideration of the "aesthetic" generally subdivides modern theories 
into four categories: 
formalism theories represented by Bell's (1958) significant 
form and Osborne's (1955) organic unity; 
expression theories of which Croce's (1970) intuition, 
Collingwood's (1970) imaginative expression and Langer's 
(1970) symbolic transformation are notable; 
aesthetic attitude theories represented by Bullough's (1970) 
psychical distance, Stolnitz's (1969) disinterested atten­
tion and Aldrich's (Dickie, 1971) "seeing as"; 
metacriticism theories of Beardsley's (1958) instrumentalism 
and Dickie's (1974) institutionalism. 
Utilizing Hein's essential components to categorize modern aesthetic 
theories leads to the following basic scheme and allows a graphic pre­
sentation to differentiate among these various theories. 
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Central Focus Theory Proponent 
In the object Significant form 
Organic unity 
Bell 
Osborne 
In the artist Intuition 
Imaginative expression 
Croce 
Collingwood 
In the perceiver Symbolic transformation 
Psychical distance 
Disinterested attention 
"Seeing as" 
Instrumentalism 
Institutionalism 
Langer 
Builough 
Stolnitz 
Aldrich 
Beardsley 
Dickie 
Central Focus--In the Object 
When the central focus of the theory is found in the object (or 
event), the concept is known as formalism. Aesthetic formalism can also 
be called aesthetic objectivism. It claims that the artist communicates 
in and through forms and that the audience enjoys the formal arrangement 
which combines formal elements into a unity. Formalism finds distin­
guishing features in the object, not in the artist or in the attitude of 
the audience. The essential object of aesthetic analysis is the concrete 
work of art, but the starting point is the individual experience of 
aesthetic emotion. 
Formalism, contrary to some interpretations, does not deny emotion. 
What it does deny is that a work of art is a means of expressing or com­
municating experience from one person to another. It states that a work 
of art is an autotelic thing, separate and newly created, which exists 
to be experienced for what it is in and of itself. Formalism, believing 
in beauty in configuration, does not deny that a work of art may and does 
serve several purposes but does indicate that purposes other than authen­
ticity are not relevant in judging artistic excellence. Formalism is a 
theory about one quality of a work of art; the quality that allows 
objects to be classified and assessed as works of art. This property/ 
element which is claimed to be the essence of artistic excellence is 
variously called form, structure and configuration. 
Significant form. The formalism of autonomous creation proposes the 
existence of the concept of significant form which focuses attention on 
the work of art itself. Bell (1958), who originated the theory, defined 
significant form as "lines and colours combined in a particular way, 
certain forms and relations of forms, [which] stir our aesthetic emo­
tions" (p. 17). The function of the artist and, consequently, the 
purpose of art, is to create, combine and arrange forms in order to move 
an audience to "rapture and ecstasy" (Weitz, 1964, p. 3). 
Bell finds in the true appreciation of art an exalted, rapturous, 
nonpractical, disinterested, pleasurable, contemplative experi­
ence, the essence of which is that it is a response to signif­
icant form. By the "unique aesthetic emotion" he means the 
totality of these characteristics (Weitz, 1964, p. 7). 
The artist sees reality as significant form, therefore, to see sig­
nificant form is a function of seeing reality in a certain way--as pure 
form. Likewise, the true spectator's view of art implies, and requires, 
rapturous, nonutilitarian and disinterested attention. Bell proposed 
that spectators are aesthetically moved by certain combinations of line 
and color because they share in the artist's unique vision of reality as 
significant form. 
Any representational elements in a work of art must be interpreted 
as combinations of line and color rather than as anything else. Repre­
sentation is always either harmless or very harmful--never beneficial. 
If ordinary (nonaesthetic) emotions are evoked by an art object, then the 
object itself is designated as "descriptive art" and has given up signif­
icant form for the representation. Bell proposed two kinds of art 
objects and two kinds of appreciation. Their relationship is diagrammed 
as: 
The essential purpose and value of this pure appreciation of the 
formally significant is escapist. The aesthetic experience/emotion is 
outside ordinary experience/life. The aesthetic experience is extra­
ordinary and allows the artist and the appreciator to escape the mundane 
cares, concerns and responsibilities of ordinary life.through the aes­
thetic emotion. The appreciation of significant form in art allows the 
artist and audience to move from everyday existence into a world of 
"rapture and ecstasy" (Weitz, 1964, p. 3). 
Organic unity. The formalism of organic unity is as configura-
tionally-oriented as that of significant form. Organic unity is: 
a configuration such that the configuration itself is prior 
in awareness to its component parts and their relations 
according to discursive and additive principles (Osborne, 
1955, p. 228). 
The difference between these two theory-aspects lies in two areas: 
in the manner in which the parts of a work of art are apprehended and in 
the form/content distinction. Significant form-formalism concentrates 
on the form (the medium of presentation) of a work of.art, generally to 
the exclusion of the content (the theme) of the work. Organic unity-
formalism makes no distinction between form and content. They are the 
same coordination of elements, characteristics and relations. 
Osborne (1955) suggested that any construct which displays organic 
unity is apprehended synoptically, as a complex whole of related parts, 
descriptive. 
formally significant . . . pure 
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not discursively, as a summation of parts. He implied that significant 
form is apprehended discursively. When attention is isolated on a part 
of a work of art, the structural qualities of the object are seen dif­
ferently from when attention is distributed over the whole work. 
Osborne's (1955) discussion of synoptic/discursive perception is in 
relation to vision, but it may be equally applicable to the other sensual 
mediums. He defined discursive seeing as switching attention rapidly 
from one section of the field to another and, therefore, the field is 
apprehended by comparing and putting together the parts which are at­
tended to separately. In synoptic seeing, the field enters into aware­
ness in a single act of evenly distributed attention. This requires 
organic unity and compactness. According to Osborne (1955), only works 
of art can be seen synoptically and the degree to which a work can be 
looked at in this manner is the degree of its beauty. Organic wholes, 
like Humpty-Dumpty, cannot be broken down and put back together. When 
broken down, the parts change and become something else. An organic 
whole is known only by intuitive apprehension of it as a whole through 
direct acquisition. Synoptic perception is both immediate and primary. 
The formal patterns/configurations directly and immediately "leap to 
awareness ..." (Osborne, 1955, p. 249). 
Synoptic apprehension requires a heightened sensual awareness which 
is much greater than that required for the normal needs of life. Only 
works of art demand or provide enough material for such heightened aware­
ness. This apprehension in appreciation causes heightened consciousness 
and enhanced mental vitality. Enhanced awareness and vitality are why 
the experiencing of beauty, through organic unity, is valued. It makes 
one more alive. 
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Weitz (1964) combined the terminology of both theory-aspects in his 
discussion of organic unity. He defined art as significant form insofar 
as it is an organic complex of elements, expressive in character and 
embodied in a sensuous medium. "Organic" means that the elements form an 
internally constituted complex and "expressive" refers to an association 
with some emotion or emotional activity. Osborne (1970) indicated that 
modern formalism or modern concern with formal/perceptual qualities of 
artworks emphasized the "emotional-expressive" significance of pictorial 
elements (line, color, shape, mass, etc.) of a work of art. Every ele­
ment means some emotion or emotional quality to every spectator; but 
quite possibly means different ones to different spectators. 
Both significant form- and organic unity-formalism suggest that 
response to the formal elements of a work of art may be different for 
different people. Sparshott (1963) asked a very interesting question 
in reference to this: 
Do tendencies to respond to form and representation respectively 
not perhaps depend on innate psychological determinants and cor­
respond to types of personality? (p. 344). 
No significant attempts have been made to answer this question. 
Summary. Formalism, in its insistence that a work of art be ana­
lyzed in terms of formal relations alone, is attractive for three rea­
sons: 1) it assures one will look at the work of art alone; 2) it offers 
refuge from subjectivity; and 3) it is equally applicable to the arts 
dependent on sight and sound. Formalism, though, is very vulnerable on 
three fronts: 1) it tends toward ambiguity when applied to the visual 
arts; 2) it assumes you can discriminate form without cognizance of the 
referent of the form; and 3) it has little application to the literary 
arts. (See Appendix B.) 
40 
Central Focus—In the Artist 
When- the central focus of the theory is found in the artist (the 
creator), the concept is generally grouped under the name of Expression­
ism. Expression theory arose in the nineteenth century as a relation to 
Romanticism. Its theorists claimed that a work of art expresses the 
qualitative character of felt emotion. In a simplistic form, the under­
lying premise of expression theory is that the artist lives through 
(actually or imaginally) an experience. Other people, through appre­
ciative contemplation, can duplicate in their own minds the artist's 
experience. Anything (object/artifact) which successfully communicates 
such an experience is a work of art. Art is excellent to the extent that 
it communicates experience. 
One use or "sense" of the word "expression" in relation to art 
theory sees art as the self-expression of the artist—as a process which 
begins in the artist's mind. Self-expression theories center their 
concern in the artist. 
Intuition. Croce's (1970) art as intuition proposal is a modern 
self-expression theory. Knowledge has two forms, intuitive or logical; 
it is obtained through either imagination or intellect; and it is of the 
individual or universal, of individual things or of relations of things. 
The formula expressed by Croce's theory, "art=intuition=expression," 
indicates that art is essentially expressive of the artist's intuitive 
interpretation of reality and human life. 
Croce points out that all art is a kind of language; it 
expresses and so fixes and makes recognizable what before 
was vague, fleeting, and merely felt (Garritt, 1969, p. 130). 
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The artist expresses the "inner feel, the subjunctive experienced 
quality, of emotional situations actual, recollected, or imagined, which 
cannot be conveyed by ordinary language" (Osborne, 1970, p. 231). An 
artist comes to terms with his feelings by experiencing those feelings in 
art form. The art form actualizes it for apprehension. Therefore, the 
purpose of art is not so much to communicate as it is to comprehend 
intuitive, personal feelings. Artistic creation is a mental process and 
the work of art is initially in the mind of the artist. The physical 
embodiment is only secondarily important. Good art is the successful 
expression of emotion. Expression consists of finding images to artic­
ulate an emotion and to make it determinate for apprehension. In "art 
as intuition" theory, the process is vastly more important than the 
product. 
Imaginative expression. Collingwood's (1970) "art as imaginative 
expression" theory was influenced by and is very similar to Croce's "art 
as imitation" theory. To Collingwood, art expressed emotion rather than 
evoking it. He made an original assumption that art has something to do 
with emotion. Emotion can be either evoked or expressed. Craft arouses 
emotion and, since art is not craft, art must express something. By this 
line of reasoning, Collingwood concluded that art is the expression of 
emotion. The imagination aspect of his theory refers to the acquisition 
of knowledge dichotomy of Croce (1970). Knowledge is obtained through 
either imagination or intellect. Art is imaginative in that it involves 
the formation of mental images "in the head." 
He claims that the only real works of art are the mental 
images formed in the mind of the artist or as he creates 
a public object or the mental images formed in the mind of 
the spectator as the result of experiencing a public object 
(Dickie, 1971, p. 91). 
The expressive process begins with the presence of chaos and con­
fusion in the artist's mind. As the emotions are expressed, clarity and 
order replace the chaos and confusion. The emotions are channeled in the 
exercise of the art medium. The artist does not know ahead of time what 
he will create because the art of expressing emotions is, in itself, an 
exploration of the nature of the emotions. Good art is art which ex­
presses emotions which were formerly unclear. Bad art is non-art (craft) 
which attempts to arouse or evoke emotion. 
Summary. Expression theory basically attempts to do three things: 
1) to show that art can do something important for people; 2) to relate 
art to the lives of people; and 3) to account for the emotional quality 
of art and for the way art moves people. As a viable theory, it fails 
to the extent that: 1) it fails to provide adequate criteria to differen­
tiate good and bad art; 2) it is subject to an intentional fallacy (the 
confusion of the intent of the artist with the properties of the work 
itself); and 3) it is subject to an affective fallacy (the confusion of 
the reactions of the spectator with the properties of the work itself). 
(See Appendix B.) 
Central Focus=-In the Perceiver 
When the central focus of a theory is found in the perceiver, the 
germinal concepts of the theories are found in several theory-aspects. 
Each of the two previous sections involved theorists who belonged to the 
same "camps." The Formalists centered in the object and the two Expres­
sionists focused on the artist. When the perceiver/critic/audience 
becomes the core of a theory, the theoretical neatness of the other 
sections gives way to a potpourri of philosophical positions. In this 
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section, one can find expressionism, attitude theory and metacriticism 
theorists all centering their proposals in the perceiver. 
Symbolic transformation. Langer (1969) was a major Expression 
theorist who dealt with the communication aspects of the art experience. 
Her theory of symbolic transformation saw art as the perceptual analogue 
of inner experience; as the symbolic expression of the artist's knowl­
edge of emotion, not his actual emotion. Langer1s symbol is not an 
iconic model. It is expressive in that it allows us (the audience) to 
make an abstraction. 
Dickie (1971) called Langer a modern imitation theorist because she 
asserted that a work of art imitates or reproduces in itself not a con­
crete, discrete, actual emotion or situation but the form, pattern—the 
gestalt—of emotional situations. 
Thus a work of art is a symbol which does not symbolize any­
thing other than itself but which reproduces in its own struc­
tural form the structure or pattern of feeling (Osborne, 1970, 
p. 246). 
The artist attempts to communicate direct awareness of the ebb and 
flow of emotional life through his work of art. These are not merely the 
personal and private emotions held or experienced by the artist but are 
the basic forms of feelings which are common to most people. Reid (1968) 
further interpreted Langer's theory and asserted that: 
If art reveals human feeling it is neither (as we know) just 
the artists' feelings before making; nor is it even anything 
so general (if indeed there jls anything so general) as "the 
form" of human feeling; what is experienced is the particular 
individual affective import of that work (p. 355). 
Attitude theory. The attitude theorists define an aesthetic object 
in terms of the perceiver's approach to it or attitude toward it. The 
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concept of attitude is polarized, placing the practical in opposition to 
the aesthetic. If you look at an apple and take note of its economic 
value or the fact that it has bruises, then you are taking a "practical" 
interest in it. On the other hand, if you are cognizant of its color, 
texture and taste, then you are considering the apple, for the time 
being, as an aesthetic object. This attitudinal way of defining "aes­
thetic object" has been found valuable by subsequent theorists because it 
offers a broad scope for critical statements. 
There are three prominent versions of attitude theory and all claim 
that there is something that a person can do which makes any perceived 
object into an aesthetic object. They differ in what it is that the 
person does: achieve distance, perceive disinterestedly or "see as." 
Psychical distance. Bullough (1970) proposed "psychical distance" 
as the distinguishing feature of an aesthetic attitude. This "distance" 
is not actual spatial or temporal distance but a "psychical" distance 
from which an object is not examined from a practical point of view in 
relation to means and ends. 
Distance is produced ... by putting the phenomenon, so to 
speak, out of gear with our practical, actual self; by allow­
ing it to stand outside the context of our personal needs and 
ends—in short, by looking at it "objectively," as it has 
often been called, by permitting only such reactions on our 
part as emphasize the "objective" features of the experience, 
and by interpreting even our "subjective" affections not as 
modes of our being rather than characteristics of the phenom­
enon (Bullough, 1970, pp. 783-784). 
According to Bullough, distance is a factor in all art and, there­
fore, is an aesthetic principle. It is accomplished by separating the 
perceived object and its appeal from the perceiver's self by an inhib­
itory aspect of "putting it [the phenomenon] out of gear with practical 
needs and ends" (Bullough, 1970, p. 785). This inhibition, which is 
necessary for aesthetic appreciation, can either be an action on the part 
of the perceiver or a psychological state into which the perceiver is 
induced. Distance is a psychological or psychical state and, as such, it 
can be both achieved and lost. "Under-" and "over-distancing" occur when 
the perceiver is out-of-synchronization with the phenomenon of interest. 
An example of under-distancing occurs when a jealous husband thinks of 
his wife's suspicious behavior while viewing a performance of Othello. 
Another person in that same audience could be guilty of over-distancing 
if he is at the performance to observe the technical aspects of the play. 
The distancing perceiver has to walk a fine line between being "in" the 
experience but detached enought to really "see" what is aesthetically 
there. 
Disinterested attention. "Psychical distance" has been defined as 
a special action or psychological state. Another attitude theorist, 
Stolnitz (1969), argued that such a special state is not needed. He 
indicated that the ordinary act of attending can be done in a special 
way. This special way of attending is called "disinterested attention." 
Disinterested attention, as opposed to practical or interested attention, 
has no ulterior purpose. It is divorced from any actual or intimate 
involvement on the part of the perceiver. The object of interest is not 
being used or manipulated for practical purposes. "There is no purpose 
governing the experience other than the purpose of just having the ex­
perience" (Stolnitz, 1969, p. 20). 
Nonaesthetic or practical interests view an object or experience 
with a concern for origins and consequences, for any interrelationships 
with other things. 
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By contrast, the aesthetic attitude "isolates" the object 
and focuses upon it—the "look" of the rocks, the sound of 
the ocean, the colors in the painting. Hence the object is 
not seen in a fragmentary or passing manner. . . . Its 
whole nature and character are dwelt upon. One who begins 
a painting merely to cover a stain on the wallpaper does not 
see the painting as a delightful pattern of colors and forms 
(Stolnitz, 1969, p. 20). 
Classifying, studying and judging are not part of the aesthetic at­
titude. An object \rtiich is disinterestedly perceived and appreciated is 
aesthetically accepted "on its own terms." The aesthetic attitude can be 
taken toward any object of awareness and "a work of art or a natural 
object may or may not be an aesthetic object, depending on whether or not 
it is attended to disinterestedly" (Dickie, 1971, p. 53). 
"Seeing as." Bullough proposed the aesthetic attitude as a special 
psychological state. Stolnitz wrote about a special kind of attention. 
Aldrich (Dickie, 1971) posited an aesthetic mode of perception. He in­
dicated that there is a specific way of perceiving aesthetically which 
will show what aspects of a work of art or nature are aesthetic and which 
are not. He maintained that the aesthetic characteristics are objec­
tively there to be experienced. The perceiver just has to look in a 
certain way to see them. This "seeing as" theory was suggested to 
Aldrich by Wittgenstein's work dealing with ambiguous figures. A good 
example of perceptual ambiguity, a square within a square drawing, can be 
found in Dickie, 1974, p. 137. What is seen is conditioned by the back­
ground of the perceiver (by what one has in mind at the time) and what is 
seen is an object of perception and is not just a thought or subjective 
image. This phenomenon of ambiguous figures, according to Aldrich, does 
not "prove," but it does prepare the reader for his theory. 
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Perception, to Aldrich, involves what he called "the phenomenon of 
categorical aspection." He postulated two kinds of perception: the or­
dinary, nonaesthetic kind of scientific inquiry and everyday life; and 
the aesthetic kind. He called the nonaesthetic perception "observation" 
and the perception characteristic of aesthetic experience is called "pre­
hension." The entity being perceived is designated "material thing." 
According to Aldrich, when a material thing is observed, it 
is realized in physical space as a physical object, but when 
it is prehended, it is realized in aesthetic space as an 
aesthetic object (Dickie, 1974, p. 138). 
These different "ways" of seeing objects are based on the fact that 
the same things do look different under differing conditions of viewing. 
Aldrich felt that his theory, by "explaining" the reason why different 
things are "seen," gives an objective rather than subjective account of 
aesthetic theory. Additionally, his theory does state that aesthetic 
objects are the proper objects for appreciation and criticism. Bullough's 
and Stolnitz's theories do not allow these appreciative and critical 
functions. 
Summary. The attitude theorists, by proposing a specific state of 
mind for the experiencing of the aesthetic, present a broad theory which 
designates as works of art all those things which are the object of the 
aesthetic attitude. This broadness allows the inclusion of many things 
as aesthetic which would certainly be excluded by the narrower theories. 
These theories do take the psychological aspects concerning art appre­
ciation and criticism into account. Additionally, they make the audience 
an important participant in the aesthetic experience. Their weaknesses 
lie in the realization that: 1) by making the perceiver so important, 
they undermine the importance of the artist and the object in the 
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aesthetic process; 2) they propose a difference between the aesthetic and 
nonaesthetic features of an object, but fail to adequately distinguish 
that difference; and 3) they fail to provide sufficient evidence that 
there is an individual, perceptually-oriented power which has the 
specific function of changing nonaesthetic features into aesthetic ones 
or which makes aesthetic characteristics accessible. (See Appendix B.) 
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CHAPTER IV 
METACRITICAL AESTHETIC THEORY 
All of the formalistic, expressionistic and attitudinal theories 
propose philosophical positions which do not appear to "work" in actual 
practice. They have not been primarily concerned with the appreciation 
and criticism of art, and yet, they arbitrarily make valuational deci­
sions concerning particular objects. Their evaluation phases are univer­
sally weak and unproven. The metacritical theories to be considered next 
are more current than formal, expression and attitude theories and re­
flect attempts to both compensate for shortcomings in the evaluation 
phases of the older theories and "to take account of the actual practice 
of critics" (Dickie, 1971, p. 147). 
Instrumentalism 
In the late 1950's, Beardsley (1958) proposed that aesthetics be 
conceived of as the philosophy of criticism. His meta- ("along with") 
critical theory in Instrumentalism was centered in the perceiver/audience 
as the focus in the valuational process. He saw aesthetics as consisting 
of the principles which clarify and confirm critical statements. 
I take as central the situation in which someone is confronted 
with a finished work, and is trying to understand it and to 
decide how good it is (Beardsley, 1958, p. 6). 
Beardsley was concerned with practical criticism. 
The function of criticism is to make statements and judgments con­
cerning works of art, aesthetic objects and aesthetic experiences. 
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According to Beardsley (1958), these critical statements are either 
normative or non-normative. The normative statements are critical eval­
uations. "Critical evaluations are those that apply to works of art the 
words 'good' or 'beautiful,' their negatives, or other predicates de­
finable in terms of them" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 9). Non-normative state­
ments either interpret or describe works of art. A critical interpreta­
tion concerns discovering the "meaning" of a work. Words such as 
"represents," "signifies," "symbolizes" or "expresses" appear in critical 
interpretations. The central focus of critical descriptions is the con­
cept of form. Statements that inform about color and shape, summarize 
plot or theme or classify compositional form are critical descriptions. 
Beardsley's Instrumentalism is a theory of evaluation based on a 
"general criterion theory." Critical reasoning about the arts presup­
poses general principles upon which judgments about particular works of 
art deductively depend. Beardsley maintained that a distinctive kind of 
experience can be isolated and described as an aesthetic experience. An 
aesthetic experience is seen as valuable in itself; therefore, the aes­
thetic object which promotes this experience is seen as valuable as a 
means to an end. This line of reasoning produced the "Instrumentalist" 
designation. Some things, like love, truth and privacy, have been 
proven, over time, to be valuable means to ends and are, therefore, given 
privileged and protected positions among the values of life. Beardsley 
believed that the arts and the experiences they provide belong in this 
company. His theory of Instrumentalism included the following concerns: 
the aesthetic object, the aesthetic experience, aesthetic value and the 
values of art. 
51 
To analyze an aesthetic object is precisely to get acquainted 
with its finer details and subtler qualities, to discover, 
in short, what is there to be enjoyed—to be responded to 
emotionally (Beardsley, 1958, p. 76). 
The term, "object," refers to any entity which can be named, talked about 
and to which characteristics can be attributed. Critical statements, to 
Beardsley, are about an "aesthetic object." 
Beardsley's development of his aesthetic object concept occurred in 
two stages. In the first stage, he sought to exclude some aspects of 
works of art from consideration as part of the aesthetic object. The 
second stage asked the question: "what distinguishes aesthetic objects 
from other perceptual objects?" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 59). 
In the initial stage, Beardsley utilized two principles: the "prin­
ciple of distinctness" and the "principle of direct perceptibility." The 
principle of distinctness sought to refute intentionalist criticism which 
indicates that the intention of the artist in producing the work of art 
is an aesthetic object of that work. To Beardsley, the aesthetic object 
is distinct from the intention of the artist. "The objective critic's 
first question, when he is confronted with a new aesthetic object, is 
not, What is this supposed to be? but, What have we got here?" (Beards­
ley, 1958, p. 29). The second principle, of direct perceptibility, con­
cerned the perceptual object and was utilized to avoid confusing the 
merely physical basis of a work from its aesthetic aspects. A perceptual 
object is one which has qualities which are open to direct sensory aware­
ness. The physical basis of that perceptual object consists of what can 
be described in the language of physics. The physical properties of 
something are not discovered by direct sensation but by such procedures 
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as measuring, weighing, cutting and burning. Beardsley concluded his 
first stage by observing that all aesthetic objects are physical objects 
but that not all perceptual objects are aesthetic objects. 
Beardsley's second stage in the development of his concept of the 
aesthetic object attempted to differentiate between aesthetic objects and 
other perceptual objects. "Aesthetic object" has been historically de­
fined in a myriad of ways. Beardsley felt that the best and most objec­
tive way to define and distinguish aesthetic objects from other percep­
tual objects is by their own characteristics, as opposed to their causes 
or effects or relations to other things. He offered a pluralistic answer 
to the question in proposing that each sensory (perceptual) field and art 
form be looked at separately. A consensus of usage for each particular 
art would then be formulated as the definition of what would be accepted 
and rejected as an aesthetic object in that medium. 
Once we have considered the basic properties of the visual 
field, we can distinguish visual aesthetic objects from 
other visible objects. . . . And once we have considered 
the basic elements of language and meaning, we can distin­
guish literary works from other discourses, philosophical, 
scientific, and practical. . . . The point of breaking the 
question up this way is that each of these distinctions 
raises its own problems. . . . Some of the distinctions will 
be more difficult than others, and all of them will, of 
course, be somewhat vague, since general usage draws no 
sharp lines (Beardsley, 1958, p. 64). 
Beardsley also relied on a consensus of usage or compilation of 
generalizations to describe his "aesthetic experience." He defined aes­
thetic experience as the "immediate effect of aesthetic objects" (Beards­
ley, 1958, p. 559), and proposed five characteristics of the experience. 
1. In an aesthetic experience, attention is fixed on heterogeneous 
yet interrelated parts of a phenomenally objective field. It is composed 
of some sensory pattern. There is a central focus, as opposed to the 
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looseness of daydreaming, and the aesthetic object controls the experi­
ence. 
2. The experience is marked with intensity and a concentration of 
experience. It marshalls "the attention for a time into free and unob­
structed channels of experience" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 528). 
3. The experience is coherent. It "hangs together" with one thing 
leading to another; with continuity of development and with an overall 
sense of pattern and coherence. Even if the experience is interrupted, 
such as occurs with intermissions, etc., a re-connection is quickly made 
with what went before and the audience is back in the same experience 
again. 
4. The experience is complete in itself. All expectations and 
impulses which are aroused are counterbalanced or resolved by other 
elements within the experience. 
Because of the highly concentrated, or localized, attention 
characteristic of aesthetic experience, it tends to mark 
itself out from the general stream of experience, and stand 
in memory as a single experience (Beardsley, 1958, p. 528). 
5. The aesthetic experience is "not real." It is "make-believe" in 
the sense that the question of reality never arises. It has the capacity 
to elicit admiration and contemplation with no need for commitment to 
practical action. "The music is movement without anything solid that 
moves; the object in the painting is not a material object, but only the 
appearance of one" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 529). 
Beardsley condensed his five characteristics into three elements: 
unity, intensity and complexity. These are the three principles on which 
judgments about particular aesthetic experiences and works of art depend. 
Both the work of art and the experience of it involve some degree of 
unity, complexity and/or intensity. These elements are connected but 
independent and aesthetic experiences differ in magnitude as a function 
of these three variables. 
Magnitude is the general term which describes all three and which 
is applied to the whole experience, including the phenomenally objective, 
affective and cognitive elements. Further clarification of Instrumen-
talism's three general principles can be shown by examples of the 
critical comments which are regularly employed when criticising objects. 
Table 1 shows these comments as well as the distillation of the five 
characteristics into the three principles. 
The Instrumentalist's definition of value involves an object's 
utility or instrumentality to a certain kind of experience. "The test 
of whether an object has aesthetic value is just that some of its pre­
sentations actually cause, and enter into, aesthetic experience" (Beards-
ley, 1958, p. 532). The definition makes the original assumption that 
having an aesthetic experience is itself valuable. The concise defini­
tion offered by Beardsley is: 
"X has aesthetic value" means "X has the capacity to produce 
an aesthetic experience of a fairly great magnitude (such 
an experience having value)" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 531). 
Note that the definition only deals with the possibility of an aesthetic 
experience. There is no stipulation that it will occur. "Capacity" is 
used in a dispositional sense of describing what effects the object is 
capable of producing. 
It should be readily apparent that Beardsley's Instrumentalist 
position follows and fits in quite well with practical criticism. A 
Table 1 
Ins trumentalism: Basic Concepts 
Examples of Critical Comments 
coherence well-organized/disorganized 
Unity formally perfect/imperfect 
completeness has/lacks inner logic of structure and style 
full of vitality/insipid 
Magnitude Intensity and concentration 
of experience 
forceful and vivid/weak and pale 
beautiful/ugly 
tender, tragic, ironic, graceful, delicate, 
richly comic 
range developed on a large scale 
Complexity of elements 
\ / 
^ diversity / 
rich in contrasts/lacks variety and repetitive 
subtle and imaginative/crude 
critic says an aesthetic object is a good one. When asked "why?" the 
answer points out the features which contribute to its having a high 
degree of unity, complexity and/or intensity. The categorizing of these 
three elements objectifies the explanation of the aesthetic experience. 
If this Instrumentalist theory is accepted, then it follows that the 
preferring of one aesthetic object over another can be rationally jus­
tified. But this is not always the case and, therefore, Beardsley in­
cluded in his theoretical position a unique feature. He allowed for the 
occurrence of preferences with no real reason for rational choice. 
In short, there will be preferences, choices among aesthetic 
objects, that fall through the wide mesh of critical argu­
ment; preferences that cannot be rationally justified. Let 
us say that such preferences belong to an Area of Undecid-
ability in the realm of critical evaluation—an area where 
rational argument does not reach, and where choice, if 
choice occurs, cannot be guided by reasons (Beardsley, 
1958, p. 536). 
This "Area of Undecidability" consists of all pairs of aesthetic 
objects, X and Y, such that it cannot be proven that X is better than Y 
or even that they are equal in aesthetic value. This area is created by 
two factors: 1) critical judgments utilize multiple criteria of value and 
2) there are a variety of qualities in aesthetic objects. 
The first factor notes that critical judgments are based on Beards-
ley's three critical principles (unity, intensity and complexity) which 
contribute to the aesthetic value of objects. These critical judgments 
utilize many differing criteria of aesthetic value. "And there is no set 
of rules that says that one of the three [principles] . . . is to be 
weighted higher than the others" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 538). The relative 
weight of each standard is an individual matter, Critic A might judge a 
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work as lacking order and Critic B might say that the work was acceptable 
because it had enough vividness to overbalance its lack of order. One 
person might be configurationally oriented and would weigh unity very 
high. Another person might place his emphasis on the intensity factor. 
These two people would probably never agree on the relative worth of many 
aesthetic objects. 
The second factor creating the area of undecidability is the variety 
of regional qualities in aesthetic objects. A sensory field is a complex 
of parts. Any object which has several parts is a complex. If a part 
cannot be further subdivided, then it is designated as an element. 
Elements have qualities to be perceived. These qualities, such as color 
and shape, are called an object's local qualities. But some complexes 
(objects) have qualities which are not qualities of their individual 
elements. A characteristic of a complex which belongs to the complex but 
not to its parts is a regional quality of the complex. A person's weight 
is a regional quality; having weight is not. All body parts have weight 
and, therefore, the fact of weight cannot be a regional quality. Weigh­
ing 130 pounds is a regional quality because none of the parts that make 
up that weight weigh that much. 
An additional example originally offered by Beardsley (1958) to 
explain this concept follows. Regional qualities have novelty in that 
they are not discernible in the parts *rtien separated, but these qtialities 
depend on the parts and their relations for their existence. The fol­
lowing design has several qualities: 
The elements can be described: A, B, C and D are circles on a white 
background. The relations between the elements can be described by uti­
lizing a geographic coordinate system. A is one-half inch west of B, C 
is one-half inch west of D, A is one-half inch north of C and B is one-
half inch north of D. Once these relations are given, the figure is 
determined and all other relations (C to B and A to D) are established. 
The regional quality of the figure as a whole is that this figure has a 
"squarish" character. Its "squarishness" is a regional quality because 
it is a feature of the complex but not of any part. A complete descrip­
tion of the figure would have to include the statement that this squar­
ish quality is present. Other, more detailed, descriptions could be 
offered but no new kind of description is possible. 
No matter how complicated we made the figure, the true 
statements describing it would fall into the same basic 
categories. There are statements about the number and 
local qualities of elements, about complexes and their 
regional qualities, about relations between elements or 
between complexes (Beardsley, 1958, p. 85). 
Because regional qualities are uniquely created by the combinations 
of their elements, the sheer number of possible regional qualities is 
infinite. Although regional qualities depend on complex perceptual con­
ditions, they are themselves relatively simple and may be just liked or 
disliked. The work of individual artists reveal unique and character­
istic recurrent regional qualities. These are the very qualities which 
will make one person like the artist's work a great deal while another 
person dislikes it intensely. The work is simply liked or disliked on the 
basis of its regional qualities and no other justification for the de­
cision is available. A "better than/worse than" distinction does not 
have to be made but a choice is implicit in any preferencing. This non-
rational choosing falls within the "Area of Rational Undecidability." 
Instrumentalism can be criticized for attempting to deal with this 
gray area of aesthetic preferencing because the explanation is somewhat 
undefinitive and confusing. Beardsley has contributed to the field of 
aesthetics with his unique area of undecidability. Some aesthetic 
objects are valued more highly than others and yet there are definite 
limitations to the rating of diverse objects on the same scale. Prefer­
ences can be presented but often cannot be rationally justified. Instru­
mentalism does allow for the occurrence of preferences with no reasons 
for rational choice. 
The Instrumentalist theory of aesthetics and aesthetic value is 
carefully composed to reveal that to accept the theory is to take for 
granted that the aesthetic experience itself is valuable. Acceptance of 
this proposition makes the value of the aesthetic object a means to an 
end. Stated differently, the capacity of an object to evoke aesthetic 
experience is not a value unless the experience, itself is seen to have 
value. If it is contended that the arts deserve a place among the "goods" 
of culture, then this position must be justified with evidence that the 
experiences they provide are, in some real way, "good" for us. According 
to Beardsley's Instrumentalism, there is no such thing as intrinsic 
value. "You can never judge the value of anything except in relation 
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to other things that are at that time taken to be valuable" (Beardsley, 
1958, p. 541). 
Historically, many assertions have been made about the inherent and 
desirable values of art. Beardsley has examined these claims for any 
cross-claim consistency and has prepared a list of "predictions" of the 
effects of aesthetic value. He formulated his listing as predictions 
rather than assertions for two reasons: 1) aesthetic value, by his def­
inition, is dispositional to the extent that it means that something has 
the capacity to produce an aesthetic experience and 2) the case is not 
totally in for the "proving" of inherent value for aesthetic objects. 
Much work is yet to be done in this area. Beardsley's listing occurs on 
two planes. The first four "predictions" concern fairly well-recognized 
claims for inherent value. The next three effects listed are more remote 
and indirect but could be, nevertheless, construed as part of the inherent 
values of art. 
1. "That aesthetic experience relieves tensions and quiets destruc­
tive impulses" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 574). This is the Aristotelian 
catharsis claim which would make art the moral equivalent for violence. 
2. "That aesthetic experience resolves lesser conflicts within the 
self, and helps to create an integration, or harmony" (Beardsley, 1958, 
p. 574). This value involves a clarification and personal integration 
effect. Having an art experience, the viewer may find himself in a 
clearer and more decisive frame of mind. This is the exhilaration, the 
"high," the tonic effect of art. 
3. "That aesthetic experience refines perception and discrimina­
tion" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 574). Having aesthetic experiences makes an 
individual better at having aesthetic experiences and, further, promotes 
increased sensitivity and perception in all phases of life. This sharp­
ening of attention would be potentially helpful in increasing the emo­
tional relations of people, for example. 
4. "That aesthetic experience develops the imagination, and along 
with it the ability to put oneself in the place of others" (Beardsley, 
1958, p. 574). This prediction deals with the fostering of eurpathic 
responses as well as with increasing the creative flexibility of and 
adjustibility of the experiencing individual. The aesthetic experience 
leads to the expansion of imaginative response and creativity. 
5 .  "That aesthetic experience is, to put it in medical terms, an 
aid to mental health, but perhaps more as a preventative measure than as 
a cure" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 575). Aesthetic experience, in a pre-
cathartic sense, would promote mental health and forestall the formation 
of many common neuroses and psychoses in a society which has adequte 
artistic outlets for high aesthetic value. 
6. "That aesthetic experience fosters mutual sympathy and under­
standing" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 575). Art can draw people together in 
friendship and mutual respect through the sharing of aesthetic experi­
ence. This shared experience builds a bond between people who have 
participated in these experiences together. 
7. "That aesthetic experience offers an ideal for human life" 
(Beardsley, 1958, p. 575). This is a social role of the arts. The aes­
thetic experience is potentially a microcosm of what is (and can be) ful­
filling in life. The close interrelationship between means and ends in 
art can help bring the means/end separation found in much of life closer 
together and, thereby, increase the richness and joy of life. 
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Beardsley developed his Instrumental aesthetic theory from a basis 
in critical practice. He indicated that there would be no problems in 
aesthetics if no one talked about works of art. But people do talk and 
the problems arise in relation to the communicative clarity and effec­
tiveness of the discussions. The older theories previously discussed 
often looked good in print but failed in actual practice. Instrumental-
ism, being metacritical, attempts to isolate and describe the features of 
experience which are pecularily characteristic of intercourse with aes­
thetic objects. Works of art are instrumentally good because they pro­
duce aesthetic experiences which are themselves good things. Since all 
works of art have some degree of unity (by the fact of their very 
presence) but not necessarily any intensity of complexity, all works of 
art have some aesthetic value. By this line of reasoning, Beardsley's 
theory accommodates the full range of negative and positive aesthetic 
evaluations. (See Appendix B.) 
Institutionalism 
By his own admission, Dickie (1971) followed the lead of Beardsley 
in developing his metacritical theory of Institutionalism. Some phases 
of the original theory were questioned and additional interpretations 
were formulated. The major criticism of Instrumentalism involved Beards-
ley's definition of aesthetic objects. Dickie argued that in order to be 
able to: 
see that an artist's intentions and an aesthetic object are 
distinct, that person must already have a clear idea of what 
the contents of the objects of criticism and appreciation 
are for works of art of that particular kind (Dickie, 1974, 
p. 171). 
He indicated that Beardsley is basically correct but that the background 
\ 
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that is necessary to have before distinguishing between intentions and 
aesthetic objects is implicit rather than explicit in Instrumentalism. 
Dickie's Institutionalism proposed that: 
In order to verify statements about aesthetic objects we 
must already know what in general to look for and at, what 
to listen for and to, and so on (Dickie, 1974, p. 173). 
The aspects of a work of art which belong to the aesthetic 
object of that work of art are determined by the conventions 
governing the presentation of the work (Dickie, 1974, p. 
149). 
The conventions mentioned deal with the spatial/temporal cues/ 
factors which serve to locate the aesthetic object for the spectator. 
In general, the ability to make the locations and distinc­
tions in a given case depend upon an understanding of the 
type of art of which the given case is an instance. This 
means that the distinguishing of aesthetic objects is a 
piecemeal affair, since it depends upon experience and 
understanding of specific art forms. Each art form has a 
primary convention or practice for presenting works of that 
type, together with a variety of secondary conventions of 
greater and lesser importance (Dickie, 1974, pp. 178-179). 
The primary convention of presentation is the understanding shared 
by the artist(s) and the audience that they are involved in a particular 
kind of formal activity. The fact that a painting is displayed is the 
primary convention of painting. The manner of display, with the design 
visible and the back to the wall, is one of the secondary conventions. 
These secondary conventions are constantly being challenged, expanded and 
changed by innovative artists in the particular art forms. Knowledge of 
the conventions is learned in a variety of ways: by direct teaching; by 
observations of others who know; and by transfer from one art form to 
another. 
Dickie's Institutionalism stressed the conventional matrix within 
which works of art are embedded and which define the characteristics of 
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art. His classificatory definition of a work of art included the condi­
tions of artifactuality and conferred status. The assumption that a work 
of art is an artifact is historically accepted by both philosophers and 
non-philosophers. The aspect of conferred status indicates the institu­
tional nature of Dickie's theory. 
The second necessary condition required that an object or event "has 
had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some 
person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the 
artworld)" (Dickie, 1974, p. 34). The artworld, consisting of the 
loosely organized association of artists, producers, audiences, reporters, 
critics, historians, theorists, etc., carries on its business at the 
level of customary practice. The minimum core of the artworld, the pre­
sentation group, includes the artists, the presenters and the goers. All 
of these roles are institutionalized and must be learned. It is not 
simply an "I christen this work a work of art" designation. The artworld, 
as do all institutions, has a background of accepted and acceptable 
practices. 
The Artworld as I conceive of it consists of a bundle of 
sub-systems — theatre, painting, sculpture, music, and so on 
--each of which furnishes background for the conferring of 
the status of objects within its domain (Dickie, 1973, p. 29). 
The status of being art can be acquired by just one person's acting 
as a representative of the artworld and treating the artifact as a candi­
date for appreciation. This conferring of status is usually done by the 
artist who created the artifact. If the artist has accomplished the 
"things" that are generally accepted as being part of the customary prac­
tice of that art form, then the artifact will be accepted by others as a 
work of art. If however, the artifact does not conform to the institu­
tional/accepted frame-of-reference, then there are two courses which can 
be pursued. A new frame-of-reference can be developed and promoted by 
its proponents. If the time is right, the new frame-of-reference will 
be accepted. "The world has to be ready for certain things, the art 
world no less than the real one" (Danto, 1964, p. 581). Or the artifact 
can be rejected as a work of art by the rest of the artworld. 
In conferring the status of art on an object one assumes a 
certain kind of responsibility for the object in its new 
status--presenting a candidate for appreciation always allows 
the possibility that no one will appreciate it and that the 
person who did the conferring will thereby lose face. One 
can make a work of art out of a sow's ear, but that does not 
necessarily make it a silk purse (Dickie, 1974, p. 50). 
Dickie's Institutional concept of art is broad enough to include, 
as art, all that is historically considered art. It takes the actual 
practice of the past and present art world into account. The theory is 
not particularily complicated and, unlike the formal, expressive and at­
titude theories, it does not try to imply "good art" when defining "art." 
Summary. No single aesthetic theory investigated is satisfactory in 
all its aspects. The best that can be hoped for is general consonance 
with current critical practice. Metacriticism meets this criterion. The 
combining of Instrumentalism and Institutionalism brings complementary 
theories together to form an objectively-oriented theory-base from which 
to examine as an aesthetic activity. Beardsley's Instrumentalism gives 
the basic general standards which can be utilized to critically analyze 
sport performance as aesthetic experience. Dickie's Institutionalism 
provides the framework (frame-of-reference) from which the institutional 
nature and conventional presentational matrix of sport can be examined as 
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aesthetic activity. Sport, in current literature, has sometimes been 
designated as aesthetic and as art. These postulates will be examined 
in relation to the theory-base formed by the interrelated Instrumentalism 
and Institutionalism. 
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CHAPTER V 
A MEIACRITICAL AESTHETIC OF SPORT 
A partial survey of several movement "systems" shows that 
symmetry and assymmetry, rhythm, balance, harmony and econ­
omy of effort, are among the most-mentioned qualities used 
i n  a s s e s s i n g  w h a t  i s  a  " g o o d "  m o v e m e n t  ( A n t h o n y ,  1 9 6 0 ,  p .  3 ) .  
Sport has aesthetic and thematic compulsion because expres­
sive modes of performing and contesting are significant and 
valued (Felshin, 1975, p. 31). 
Those eclectic lovers of sport who hold that all sport is 
beautiful may find such beauty in the spectator appeal, in 
a player's imagination for the game, in the intensity and 
steadiness of a champion, in the perfectionist's zeal, or 
perhaps even in the briefest shorts on some coordinated 
gamin (Miller and Russell, 1971, p. 104). 
The word "sport" symbolizes a complexity that regularly reveals new 
facets. It is used to describe game activities which are very diverse 
and which occur on an almost unlimited number of skill and organizational 
levels. The word is also used, with modifiers, as a descriptor to ac­
curately pinpoint areas of scholarly inquiry. 
Sport theorists, representing many differing interests, examine 
sport from the perspectives of psychology, sociology, philosophy, bio-
dynamics and exercise science. These areas are then often fragmented 
further to concentrate on more specific aspects of sport. 
Sport, as reported by Baitsch (1972), has been viewed, for example, 
as a medium of self- and life-fulfillment; as play; as ethical training; 
as a socialization process; as a sign-world of reality; as a safety valve 
for aggression; and as an aesthetic phenomenon. This last area of 
\ 
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inquiry, aesthetics of sport, has become increasingly significant and 
meaningful to many sport theorists and aestheticians as evidenced by 
publications in the area. This study seeks to provide a germinal founda­
tion, based in metacritical aesthetic theory and in sport theory, for the 
concept "aesthetic of sport." 
Beardsley (1958) defined aesthetic experience as the "immediate 
effect of aesthetic objects" (p. 559), and proposed five characteristics 
of the experience. 
1. The aesthetic experience has a central focus wherein attention 
is fixed on heterogeneous yet interrelated parts of a phenomenally ob­
jective field. The aesthetic object (performance) controls the experi­
ence. 
2. The experience is intense and involves a concentration of exper­
ience. It marshalls "the attention for a time into free and unobstructed 
channels of experience" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 528). 
3. The experience is coherent. One thing leads to another. There 
is continuity of development and an overall sense of pattern and coher­
ence. The experience "hangs together" and even if it is interrupted, 
with an intermission, etc., a re-connection is quickly made and the 
audience is back in the same experience again. 
4. All expectations and impulses aroused are counter-balanced or 
resolved by other elements within the experience, making the experience 
complete in itself. 
. . . because of the highly concentrated, or localized, at­
tention characteristic of aesthetic experience; it tends to 
mark itself out from the general stream of experience, and 
stand in memory as a single experience (Beardsley, 1958, p. 
528). 
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5. The aesthetic experience is "not real"; in fact, the question 
of reality never arises. The experience has the capacity to elicit ad­
miration and contemplation with no need for any commitment to practical 
action. 
These five characteristics were condensed by Beardsley into three 
elements: unity, intensity and complexity. These are the three aes­
thetic-designating factors on which judgments about particular aesthetic 
experiences and works of art depend. 
The characteristics of coherence and completeness form the factor of 
unity. Critical comments dealing with form, organization and the logic 
of structure and style are recognized as statements dealing with the 
unity of an aesthetic experience. 
The intensity factor and its attendant concentration of experience 
aspect are characterized by critical interpretations dealing with the 
forcefulness, vividness, beauty and vitality of an experience. Comments 
indicating tragedy, irony, grace, delicacy, tenderness and comedy are 
descriptive of the intensity of an experience. 
T̂ ie complexity factor deals with the range and diversity of elements 
within the aesthetic experience. Descriptors of the scale, richness and 
variety, subtlety and imaginativeness of the experience are common 
critical statements related to this factor. 
Both the work of art and the experience of it involve some degree of 
unity, complexity and/or intensity. These factors are connected yet 
independent and aesthetic experiences differ in magnitude as a function 
of the three variables. Magnitude is the general term which describes 
all three and which is applied to the whole experience, including the 
phenomenally objective, affective and cognitive elements. 
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Beardsley's Instrumentalist position follows and fits in very well 
with current critical practices in both art and sport. The critic makes 
an assessment and when asked to justify, points out the features which 
contribute to the experience or object having a high degree of unity, 
complexity and/or intensity. The categorizing of these three elements 
objectifies the explanation of the aesthetic experience. 
The authors' contention that the literature dealing with sport 
reveals consistent usage of aesthetic-designating factors in discussing 
the beauty of sport is supported by Smith (1968). She posited that the 
general formal/structural principles of aesthetics can be employed to 
evaluate any object or activity. Such concepts as line, space, rhythm, 
contrast, repetition, balance, color can be used to assess the human body 
in motion. 
Since aesthetics is based on perception, to appreciate the 
beauty of the human body in motion one must make an effort 
to "see" the form as well as the function of movement pat­
terns (Smith, 1968, p. 62). 
The presence of all three aesthetic-designating factors is evidenced 
in a classic discussion by Browne (1917). His book, The Esthetics of 
Motion, dealt primarily with what he called "the psychology of grace and 
the expression of movement." In this work which is germinal to a con­
sideration of an aesthetic of sport, Browne discussed the factors in 
sport that contribute to beautiful movement. 
Grace is more than mechanical beauty. To create the impres­
sion of physical ease, movements should conform to our in­
dividual habits, be made without visible effort, without 
noise, with apparent lightness, with a maximum of stability, 
and a minimum of apparent resistence; in addition, there 
ought to be some obvious variety in rhythm, obvious freedom 
in the purpose, and a certain prodigality of effort—too ob­
vious economy robs movements of their grace (Browne, 1917, 
p. 32). 
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Most of Browne's comments can be directly categorized to the three 
aesthetic-designating factors. 
Unity Intensity Complexity 
conform to individual prodigality of effort variety in rhythm 
habits (i.e., normal minimum apparent freedom in purpose 
movement patterns) resistance 
apparent lightness 
maximum stability 
no visible effort 
no noise 
The comments requiring "no visible effort" and a "prodigality of 
effort" are not really contradictory, although, without elucidation, they 
may seem so. Browne's requirement of "absence of visible effort" dealt 
with eliminating as many as possible of the physical manifestations of 
effort; the swelling neck veins, red face and facial contortions partic­
ularly. He felt that such signs of muscular effort negated the impres­
sion of perfect ease. "Prodigality of effort" is an adjunct of effort­
lessness. The performer must demonstrate, with small shows of force or 
little bravado flourishes of difficulty overcome, that economy of effort 
is not parsimony. Too obvious economy of effort robs movement of its 
intensity and prodigality "will by an actual intensification of effort 
dispel the impression of effort" (Browne, 1917, p. 23). 
Browne's comments have been used as an introduction and as a model 
for the material which follows. Each aesthetic-designating factor and 
the sport literature which complements the factor is dealt with sep­
arately. 
Unity 
The beauty of human form with its proportions, its balance, 
its symmetry, rhythm and power to express was recognized as 
art itself. Han became aware of movement, design, line, rhythm 
—these, the very substance of art (Pendergast, 1937, p. 68). 
The most obvious manifestation of unity involves spatial and tem­
poral boundaries of performance. Both aesthetic and sport experiences 
are characterized by time and place structuring (Felshin, 1975; Kitchin, 
1966; Thomas, 1973). Sport contests are definitely organized and "Ath­
letic contests, like dramatic tragedy, are divided into time periods of 
varying lengths" (Keenan, 1972, p. 13). Both sport and art have rules 
of performance, unities of space and time and unique/special ways of 
using time and space (Kuntz, 1974). More specifically, sport provides 
unity by being spatially immediate and temporally recurring. For 
instance, Kostelanetz (1973) has proposed that the spatial and temporal 
rhythm of football has a definite form. The action can be traced through 
the stages of stasis, purpose, passionate pursuit, chaos and a return to 
stasis. Such "plotting" of the rhythm of a sport shows the formal unity 
which can be identified. "The most beautiful sporting events are those 
both formally beautiful and enhanced by the expression of practical fit­
ness" (Roberts, 1975, p. 98). 
Performance skill is also an aspect of formal unity. Aesthetic 
response to sport movement is, according to Lowe (1971), derived from two 
sources: from an empathic response to the action itself or from individ­
ual interpretation of the form, technique and composition of the move­
ment. The art which is to be found in sport is expressed through "skill 
in movement expressing beauty" (Kovich, 1971, p. 42). 
White (1975) indicated that the great moments in sport, discussed 
from an aesthetic point of view, are germinally dependent on the skill or 
technical excellence of the performer. This excellence is, of course, 
relative to the level at which the performance occurred. 
Well-executed movement, which displays balance, rhythm, economy of 
effort, yields greater pleasure for the spectator than random, undis­
ciplined, arhythmic movement patterns. The competitive rules and pur­
poses drive the competitors toward their sport goal. If this goal is 
reached through well-executed movements, then an appreciation of the 
aesthetics of the situation widens the perceptual field and heightens 
discernment (Smith, 1968; Best, 1975). 
A specific movement is aesthetically satisfying only if, in 
the context of the action as a whole, it is seen as forming 
a unified structure which is regarded as the most economical 
and efficient method of achieving the required end (Best, 
1975, p. 44). 
The smoothness and flow of a sport performer's movements reflect the 
economy and efficiency of effort, the skill, of the performance (Kupfer, 
1975) . There should be no wasted energy and no superfluous movement. 
The total coordination of body and movement parts are fundamental to 
skilled execution and are basic to aesthetic appreciation. Sport goals 
can be achieved through random or accidental movement patterns but "A 
smooth, flowing style is more highly regarded aesthetically because it 
appears to require less effort for the same result than a jerky one" 
(Best, 1975, p. 46). 
Form is another aspect of unity which is important to both sport and 
art. Form, of human bodies moving and interacting, is displayed in all 
sport performances. It is evaluated only in some sports. Ziff (1974), 
although denying the aesthetic as a viable concern of sport, admitted 
that some sports do display aesthetically appealing form and even that 
some sports are definitely aesthetic in that form was an evaluating 
factor in judging them. 
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Sandle's (1972) discussion of form in sport indicated that "form can 
exist as a relationship among several moving elements, among moving and 
static elements, or among different phenomenal sequences of movement 
(such as tempo)" (p. 132). Form in both sport and art is perceived as a 
sense of pattern and is described in both formal and expressive terms 
(Reid, 1970). Formal properties such as balance, symmetry, continuity 
are often linked with the more expressive descriptors such as dynamic, 
strong, and graceful. 
Toynbee (1972) felt that team sports particularly exhibited flowing, 
continuous patterns and designs of movement through their positional 
play. He believed there is a real sense of design in sport. It is both 
spatial and temporal and exists both with and among teams and individual 
players. Kupfer (1975) even contended that the form of a sport was an 
essential reason governing the choice of watching or playing one sport 
rather than another. 
According to Fisher (1972), sport has unity or wholeness in the 
action of one contest. Every movement within the contest is an integral 
part of the whole and harmony is displayed. 
Harmony may be discerned in the creative use of space and 
rhythm in both individual movements and in the action as a 
whole, in the patterns of the game (pp. 320-321). 
The aesthetic in movement occurs when the feel, whether actual or 
empathic, and the sport goal of the movement are in harmony in action. 
The sweet shock of impact of a perfectly timed stroke in 
any striking skill; the total harnessing of applied effort 
when the rhythm of a crawl stroke is just right; the feel 
of a back-somersault which fits the sequence of rebound on 
a trampoline; a mohawk on skates without a trace of snatch; 
these are the kinds of experiences in action when mind and 
body sing in tune (Munrow, 1972, p. 104). 
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Sport performances display a unity of purpose which is akin to that found 
in art (Keenan, 1972). Everything is focused toward the achievement of 
the sport goal and useless motions, which do not contribute to the com­
pletion of movement skills, detract from the unity, wholeness and grace 
of the sport performance (Browne, 1917). 
There is also a unity or wholeness in sport which is formed in the 
context of the opposition necessary for the sport to take place. Kupfer 
(1975) suggested that in the tensions between opponents and the coordina­
tions among teammates, individual players come together to form a whole. 
"Concepts such as timing, jelling, flowing, harmonizing, and executing 
attest to this aesthetic ideal in competitive sport" (p. 88). In terms 
of the spectator: 
The wholeness and finality possible in competitive sporting 
events, paradigmatic in the artistic, answers the human de­
sire for completeness and unity, if only in symbol (Kupfer, 
1975, pp. 88-89). 
Summary/Unity. Unity in sport performances, then, is displayed 
through spatial and temporal considerations; through technical skill in 
performance standards concerned with the efficiency and economy of 
effort; through the display and evaluation of formal design and expres­
sive qualities; and through the twin concepts of harmony and wholeness. 
The coordination and interdependence among these various unity aspects 
is most pointedly shown in a discussion by Ames (1956). He chose to 
introduce his aesthetic discussion of "What is form?" with an explanation 
of how form functions in athletics. Ames felt that unity and coherence 
are products of aesthetic form. 
In athletics we are familiar with form as the difference 
between what is done and how it is done. Whether a runner 
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is a winner or not, we may admire how he has been trained 
to swing his arms close to his ribs, not too high and not 
too low, balancing a smooth gait that all goes ahead, with­
out chopping and without wobbling or flying out. Form en­
ables a man to clear the hurdles without rising or changing 
his stride; and takes a jumper or vaulter over the bar with 
minimum effort. Form is all the fancy diver has to offer, 
from the moment he steps on the board until he disappears 
without a splash. A football player, in grace of movement, 
in the pattern of his posture, shift and charge, coordinates 
with teammates and goes through signals like a dancer doing 
steps with the rest of the troupe. Lovers of the game, 
much as they care about having their side win, enjoy fol­
lowing each play's intricacies which are missed by the un­
initiated. In boxing the How of play and plot is shown and 
masked by footwork, tip of head and ripple of the body, as 
well as by the logic of the gloves, and is what fans pay to 
see along with punishment and blood. So a cowboy in the 
saddle is a music of balance and motion. Any man at his 
own work or fun, if it is fit for a man and he is good at 
it, will show the economy of effort and lack of strain that 
makes for form (Ames, 1956, p. 85). 
Intensity 
. . .  i f  o n e  w a t c h e s  t h e  s o m e t i m e s  e x t e n d e d  a n d  e l a b o r a t e  
preparation of an athlete on his mark for a sprint or a long 
jump, it certainly looks as though something very intense 
were going on, and a tension released in the action (Reid, 
1970, p. 270). 
Sport contains experiences which for participant and spec­
tator alike are frequently unique in their intensity (White, 
1975, p. 124). 
Sport is perceptually complex and intense (Roberts, 1975). It in­
volves •sriiat Kostelantz (1973) referred to as "stunning kinetic images" 
(p. 54). Power and beauty, which are aspects of Beardsley's intensity 
factor, are found, in varying degrees, in sport performances (Bannester, 
1964). The intensity factor involves a concentration of experience which 
is clearly shown in sport through intense moments of emotional unifica­
tion and climax (Kuntz, 1974). 
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The intensity of sport is most commonly discussed in relation to two 
focuses: the aesthetic value of the human form in motion and the dynamic 
tensions created by the competition and conflict, the interactions, of 
sport (Gebelwicz, 1965). Additionally, according to Reid (1970), the 
spectacle of sport which includes the more peripheral aspects of pregame 
introductions and postgame rituals, organized cheering, team nicknames, 
mascots and colors, etc., are other intensity-producing parts of sport. 
He felt that the spectacle of sport forms a very rich aesthetic experi­
ence for the spectator. The spectators become the frame and their cheer­
ing the accompaniment to the spectacle of sport. 
Authors, writing for centuries, have described the intensity, beauty 
and formal perfection of the human body moving in sport activities 
(Fisher, 1972; Renshaw, 1975; Sandle, 1972; Thomas, 1974). Many des­
criptions utilized in relating sport performances highlight the aesthetic 
concept of intensity: "... supple stretch ....... fluid thrusts 
. . . . . . .  h a r m o n i o u s  c o n t r o l  . . . . . . .  r h y t h m i c  b u r s t  .  .  .  ,  
• • • crescendo coil . . ." (Miller and Russell, 1971, p. 103). 
In an aesthetic consideration of sport, the focus is on the beauty 
of the human form in motion. The efficiency, grace, ease of skilled 
movement, rhythm, tension, flow, suppleness, of the sport performer are 
critically examined in the aesthetic assessment (Fisher, 1972; Renshaw, 
1975; Thomas, 1974). Sandle (1972) further indicated that the dynamic 
flow of movement, the tensions, the spatial and temporal interrelation­
ships among bodies and body parts, contribute to the aesthetic quality of 
sport. 
Kovich (1971) suggested that the performer and spectator can share 
the intensity of the sport experience by becoming sensitive to the move­
ment elements of space, force and time. The feel of freedom in flight; 
the rhythm of skilled performance; the precarious balance produced by 
strength, concentration and control all contribute to the shared inten­
sity of sport performances. As the athlete experiences the movement in 
relation to a harmony of sensation, the spectator sees the movement in 
relation to its rhythm, force and space aspects (Baitsch, 1972; Laban, 
1947). 
Lowe (1977) proposed that the intensity of the sport experience is 
heightened by the amount of risk, originality and virtuosity displayed by 
the performer. The flawless execution of a difficult skill intensifies 
the aesthetic experience both visually and experientially. Skilled 
performances in sport heighten the essence of the experience, enabling 
the spectator to "see" "the poise of balance, the smoothness of rhythm, 
the power of a leg leaping, the effort of a muscle taut with strain" 
(Pavlich, 1966, p. 9). 
In a discussion of responses to visual form, Arriheim (1951) proposed 
that visual forms contain directed tensions. His essay repeatedly men­
tioned the intensity and strong dynamic effort of the aesthetic response 
to pictures depicting movement as well as the response to movement itself. 
In particular, it is characteristic of artistic vision that, 
for instance, the gesture of an arm is not noticed simply 
as a displacement in space but felt as being soft or abrupt, 
graceful or jerky." But such experiences are not limited to 
artists. The dynamic component is a part of the everyday 
experience of movement. Strictly speaking, there is prob­
ably no such thing as a perception of movement devoid of dy­
namics, even though there may be great individual differences 
in the strength and awareness of it (p. 276). 
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The previous discussions have pointed out that the movement in sport 
can be creative, beautiful and dramatically tense. Sport performances, 
to be aesthetic events, according to Kaelin (1968), become "a unique 
context of dramatically significant tensional wholes" (p. 26). Sport 
builds up, sustains, compounds and releases tensions (Kaelin, 1968). 
The drama of sport, according to Kitchin (1963), comes from the 
display of conflict and controlled aggression. In an article dealing 
specifically with tennis, soccer and rugby, Kitchin (1966) contended that 
the conflict of sport is "a duel in the kind of tension aimed at by 
Strindberg and comparably ruthless" (p. 607). Through conflicts, col­
lisions of intent, climactic moments, bizarre happenings and Dionysiac 
rituals, sport reveals itself as an extremely intense experience for both 
the performer and spectator. 
Kupfer (1975), in a discussion of the purpose and beauty of sport, 
indicated that sport involves tension between opponents and coordination 
within teams. Aesthetic values related to the intensity of the experi­
ence arise from these human interactions. 
Kaelin (1968), in a germinal argument for a consideration of sport 
as aesthetic activity, proposed that dynamic tensions are created through 
sport performances. He indicated that the conflict produced by opposing 
wills to win made the game an aesthetic event. The tempo and rhythm of 
a game are shown through the build-up and release of dynamic tensions. 
These are tensions created by the competition among equally capable teams 
or individuals. 
The game itself considered as an aesthetic object is per­
ceived as a tense experience in which pressure is built up 
from moment to moment, sustained through continuous opposi­
tion until the climax of victory or defeat (Kaelin, 1968, 
p. 25). 
\ 
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Intensity in sport, is also related to the dramatic and emotional 
responses to the action and uncertainty of outcome. Sport has the power 
to excite (Felshin, 1975). As in art, excitement attracts attention and 
adds intensity (Keenan, 1972). The movement in sport can be creative, 
lyrical and dramatically tense (Williams, 1970), Jeu (1975), in his 
definition of sport, indicated that the aesthetic essence of sport is 
tragedy. The drama and doubt over the final outcome provides a dynamic 
tension even beyond that found in theatre. Sport, by requiring the total 
involvement of both spectator and participant, encompasses the whole 
range of emotions. Emotional responses to sport display the full spec­
trum from joy and excitement to sadness and despair (Pavlich, 1966). 
Summary/intensity. Intensity in sport performances is show through 
the power, beauty and formal aesthetic factors displayed by the skilled 
human form in sport motion; through the dynamic tensions formed by the 
flow of movement and the rhythmic, force and spatial/temporal interrela­
tionships of bodies and body parts; through the risk, virtuosity and 
originality displayed by the participants; through the dynamic tension 
produced by the conflict and the opposition of wills to win; and through 
the dramatic and emotional responses to the action and the uncertainty 
of outcome. 
The athlete in action is a perfect embodiment of all that 
is beautiful in art; not only beauty of movement, but beauty 
of intense vital movement—vigorous art. The struggle por­
trayed in the movement of the athlete's body, the working 
musculature, the captured action portrayed successfully in 
split seconds of "arrested movement," surpasses any art 
creation produced by man (Pendergast, 1937, p. 70). 
Complexity 
Any consideration of sport must reveal that the concept itself is 
complex. Sport is a complex whole which is formed from many different 
levels (Jeu, 1972). Besides the obvious complexity derived from the 
myriad of activities functioning within the rubric of sport, there is 
also a complexity which is formed by the many "viewpoints" one can take 
in an examination of sport. Sport has been examined from the perspec­
tives and modes of inquiry of sociology, philosophy, psychology, history, 
biodynamics, etc. 
Jeu (1972) has suggested that one can contemplate sport movement and 
form, the moral elements of fair play and sportsmanship, as well as, the 
appreciation by the knowledgeable observer of the abilities of the play­
ers. The very fact that at least twenty definitions of sport exist (see 
Appendix A) argues for the complexity of the concept. 
The dramatic aspects of sport offer diversity within the experience. 
Athletic contests often contain the dramatic element of reversal, a 
sudden change of advantage during the contest. Sport is rich in these 
moments which vividly contrast victory and defeat in a sudden reversal of 
action (Keenan, 1972; Kitchen, 1966). The concept of personal style of 
moving also adds drama and complexity to sport performances. "Sport 
translates simple themes into complex dimensions of style and, in so 
doing, provides dramatic satisfaction" (Felshin, 1975, p. 31). Maheu 
(1963) stated in his discussion of sport and culture that the beauty of 
sport can be found in the "performance of an action that is unique" (p. 
52). 
\ 
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Functional perfection, the mastery of bodily movements, allows the 
performer to move smoothly and fluidly with appropriate rhythms of ten­
sion and relaxation. Once this is achieved, then the performer can "give 
the movement expressive form which is his own creation, and which is 
meaning-embodied" (Reid, 1970, p. 250). This is what is meant by style. 
No two people do the same task in the same way. Sport participants 
display their own assertion of personality in the style quality of their 
performance. "Thus individuality asserts itself even, seemingly, at that 
highest pitch of perfection which characterizes both art and sport" 
(Maheu, 1963, p. 32). 
Lowe (1977), in a discussion of modern Olympic gymnastics, has in­
dicated that the style of performance is increasingly important. The 
gymnast is challenged to utilize "provocative, personal, free-flowing 
movements in which the illusion of ease and flight are valued" (p. 118). 
He further stated that complexity, a judged component of composition, is 
an artistic quality of performance. 
The creative gymnast who modifies the usual or expected into 
the novel or unexpected approaches his performance with the 
psychological set of an artist (p. 121). 
Another complexity-producing aspect of sport is created by sports 
rules, boundaries and regulations. The rule-imposed confines and 
precise, geometric spatio-temporal boundaries of sport require invention 
and improvisation on the part of the participants. "Sport instantiates 
man's capacity to improvise in the midst of structured stress" (Kupfer, 
1975, p. 89). Keenan (1972) has suggested that: 
Perhaps it is the ability to cope with the novel immediately 
and skillfully which provides us [the spectator] with an 
aesthetic quality in the athletic contest (p. 5). 
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Brown and Gaynor (1967) proposed an action theory of creativity 
which indicated that creativity will occur during athletic action and 
that it operates in movement like it acts in other processes. They 
stated that the competitive sport situation is an arena where confusion 
and chaos are rampant. Invention, improvisation and experimentation by 
the participants are necessary for adaptation to the ever-changing vista 
of a sport situation. Brown and Gaynor also indicated that "The creative 
person can fulfill his search for complexity by participating on a team 
or playing in a competitive game" (p. 160). 
Several authors have discussed the nc /elty, the uniqueness, the 
chaos of sport. Kostelanetz (1973) saw football as displaying complex 
and precise ensemble movements within and among groups revealing patterns 
of evolution and resolution. To Toynbee (1972), no two sports or sport 
actions were alike. The design and pattern to be found in a particular 
contest was unique and specific to that sport situation. The spontaneity 
revealed in game patterns prompted Fisher (1972) to propose that within 
sport "there is the presentation of pure possibility" (p. 319). 
Browne (1917), in a consideration of the beautiful in movement, 
discussed the unity factors of regularity, adaptation to desired end and 
economy of effort. But then he proposed that: 
to produce expression of grace, the rhythm must not be too 
monotonous, the object not too apparent, and the economy not 
too strict (p. 21). 
Graceful lines are those which are created through free, easy, supple 
movement. The movement must have a purpose but should show a certain 
potential and actual variety in the achievement of that purpose. 
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Summary/Complexity. Complexity in sport performances is displayed 
through the range and diversity among the kinds of sport activities 
available to participants and spectators; through the dramatic concepts 
of reversal and style; through the many "viewpoints" from which sport can 
be examined (sociology, psychology, philosophy, biomechanics, aesthetics); 
and through the uniqueness, novelty and spontaneity found in sport 
actions. 
Variability in the Exhibition of 
Aesthetic-Designating Factors 
The above discussions have sought to describe the presence of the 
aesthetic-designating factors of unity, intensity and complexity in sport 
performances. The proof of presence, however, has not indicated any 
variability in the exhibition or visibility of these factors. 
There are three viewpoints concerning the exhibition and visibility 
of the aesthetic in sport. Some sport theorists propose that all sports 
have aesthetic features; some believe that the variability to be found 
occurs among contests or events; and then there are those writers who see 
variability from sport to sport. 
All sport is aesthetic. Kuntz (1974) and Miller and Russell (1971) 
have indicated that lovers of sport would argue that all sport is beau­
tiful and that all sports have aesthetic elements. 
Keenan (1972), in his discussion of the Aristotelian model of 
tragedy in relation to sport, indicated that beauty is found in all 
sports. The aesthetic in sport is found in the drama of sport. Drama is 
seen in every athletic contest in which the outcome is uncertain. Keenan 
suggested that beauty can.be seen in the grace and skill in gymnastics; 
in the coordination and style in synchronized swimming; in the acrobatic 
mastery of diving; and in the skill, precisioned movement, coordination 
of effort and unity of purpose in team sports. 
Kupfer (1975) has proposed that all sports have aesthetic features. 
They all display economy and efficiency of effort; the tensions and in­
tensity of human interactions; rhythm; and the drama of opposition of 
•wills to win. Kupfer further suggested that the aesthetic in sport is 
concerned with the excellence of play of a sport. The aesthetic cannot 
be seen as secondary to the main purpose of the sport since excellence 
and, therefore, the aesthetic, is central to all sport. 
Variability contest to contest. Browne's (1917) discussion of the 
aesthetic in sport was generalized across sport and examples of each of 
his points were taken from a variety of sports. He found the aesthetic 
to be specific to particular performances rather than to particular 
sports. Variability in grace, use of force and rhythm occurs from 
performer to performer, from contest to contest rather than being iden­
tified with specific sports. 
Gaskin and Masterson (1974) saw the aesthetic in sport in relation 
to formal aesthetic qualities and indicated variability not from sport to 
sport but from contest to contest. The elements of composition and 
structure (unity), rhythm and harmony (unity and complexity), empathy 
(intensity) and color and tension (intensity) are different for each 
performance of every sport. 
Jeu (1972) saw the essence of the aesthetic in sport as tragedy, the 
staging of violence and death. He indicated that there must be doubt 
over the final outcome and there must be the opposition of wills to win. 
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Sporting performances which highlight and emphasize these qualities are 
"more aesthetic" than those which do not. Contests in which the teams or 
individuals are not evenly matched; contests in which one side admits 
defeat before the final action; and contests which are "fixed" are all 
examples of "less aesthetic" sport performances according to Jeu's 
standards. 
Kaelin's (1968) view of what makes sport aesthetic is very similar 
to Jeu's (1972). He proposed that sport is made aesthetic by the com­
petition. The opposition of wills to win creates dynamic tensions. 
Those contests which build-up, sustain, complicate and release dynamic 
tensions are aesthetic. Playing for a tie is never aesthetic. Some 
contests, because of the evenness of skill levels, preparation, desire 
to win, etc., create more tension and intensity than other performances. 
This factor of dynamic tension and intensity varies in relation to the 
individual contest and is not defined particularly by the structure of 
the particular sport. 
Kostelanetz (1973), in a discussion of the aesthetic to be found in 
football, proposed that professional games were more aesthetic than any 
other level of sport because the performance skill and proficiency was 
higher. He saw grace and beauty in relation to the skill of the per­
formers and concluded that the aesthetic in sport varies from contest to 
contest depending on the skill and organizational levels of performance. 
Toynbee (1972) defined the aesthetic in sport in relation to the 
design elements of balance, controlled movement and interrelated and 
interdependent patterns of action. Each contest is unique and different 
in the exhibition of these elements. 
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Each match played to the same rules by different teams, or 
the same team at different times, or even between the same 
teams on the same ground on different days, contains the 
same timeless elements and yet the human beings playing it • 
create an intense individuality, sometimes of greatness, 
sometimes of bathos [pathos], but whether memorable and 
stirring or not, each match is different from every other, 
each pattern and design is unique (Toynbee, 1972, p. 306). 
Variability sport to sport. Brown and Gaynor (1967) saw differences 
in the creativity potential among sports. Some sports present many oppor­
tunities for improvisation and spontaneity. These sports provide more 
potential action-alternatives for the participants. Brown and Gaynor 
proposed a "calisthetic-noncalistetic continuum" in which the calis-
thetic activity, such as a fifty-yard dash, offers fewer action-alter­
natives than a noncalistetic activity, like intercepting a football and 
making a return run. 
The potential operational use of the creative process is 
directly related to the point on the continuum at which the 
action situation falls. The more variables the action situ­
ation offers, the more the individual can use his creative 
resources (p. 159). 
Team sports, because of the opportunity for individual action and 
group interaction, offer more chances for creativity than do individual 
sports. Group creativity in team sports is influenced by three factors: 
the combining of individual creativity; team interaction; and game struc­
ture. Some sports, like baseball, have very set and confined patterns of 
action. 
Variability in creativity can be seen from contest to contest as 
well as from sport to sport when using Brown and Gaynor's action-alter-
native proposal. Some teams and individuals in all sports display a very 
set, methodical style of play which does not offer much complexity or 
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intensity. Differing game plans do exhibit variability across contests 
as well as across sports. 
Geblewicz (1965) indicated that the spectacle of sport contributes 
to the aesthetic considerations. In this respect, sports do differ in 
relation to the exhibition of aesthetic factors. The rules, history and 
traditions of some sports dictate the presence of the more spectacular 
elements of rituals and ceremonies, parades of participants, elaborate 
costuming, and fanfares. 
Geblewicz proposed a continuum which classified the aesthetic in 
sport according to the appearance and importance of both the form and 
beauty of the movements displayed and the spectacular elements present. 
For instance, in tennis the beauty of the movements plays a 
greater part than in football. In general, sports might be 
divided into a series in accordance with their spectacular 
values, the first place being occupied by certain forms of 
gymnastics, while in the last place archery and shooting 
would be classed (p. 56). 
Best (1975) classified physical activity in relation to means/end 
relationships. Those activities in which the aim can be specified in­
dependently of the manner of achieving it are designated as purposive 
activities. Some examples of purposive sports are football, golf, tennis 
and track and field. In some activities the aim and means of achievement 
cannot be considered apart from one another and these are labeled as aes­
thetic activities. Examples of aesthetic sports are gymnastics, diving, 
figure skating and skiing. The third category defines those artistic 
activities, like dance and mime, in which it would be illogical to try 
to distinguish means from ends. 
Best, therefore, differentiated among sports in relation to sport 
goals. In most sports the end is more important than the manner of 
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achieving it and the aesthetic is incidental. He did not propose a 
spectrum to fix various sports on a continuum because he indicated that 
he could not find many mid-spectrum sports. The only sport Best could 
identify for a mid-position -which mixes purposive and aesthetic evalua­
tion was ski-jumping and the identification of only one sport in the 
middle does not justify a continuum. 
Renshaw (1975) utilized Best's (1975) means/end classification sys­
tem to also discuss the exhibition and variability of aesthetic features 
among sports. Those sports in which there is a very close connection 
between function and form r-'«re designated as aesthetic sports. Olympic 
gymnastics, diving, figure-skating and skiing were so designated. The 
aesthetic sports are evaluated all or in part with aesthetic criteria: 
form, style, balance, grace, rhythm, line and economy of effort. The way 
the movement is performed is important and, therefore, the aim cannot be 
seen in isolation from the means. 
The majority of authors indicating variability among sports in the 
exhibition of aesthetic-designating factors did so on the basis of evalu­
ation procedures. 
Gaskin and Masterson (1974) and Lowe (1977) suggested that in some 
sports, such as diving, skating, gymnastics and ski jumping, the aes­
thetic component is fundamental to their judgment. Variability is dem­
onstrated, therefore, when an aesthetic quality of execution is seen as 
part of the definition of a successful performance in some sports and not 
in others. 
Reid (1970) proposed a purpose-oriented continuum to classify sport. 
Some sports, like gymnastics, diving and skating, have as central to 
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their games purpose ail aesthetic element in which the grace and manner of 
moving is important. In these sports, the way the movement is performed 
is evaluated by a judge and is counted in the scoring. All spectator 
sports have an aesthetic element which is associated with the spectacle 
(the cheering, color and intensity of the spectator experience) of their 
being played but Reid concluded that variability can be found primarily 
in the relation of aesthetic factors to games purpose. 
Ziff (1974), even in contending that there is nothing to be gained 
from considering sport from an aesthetic view, declared that some sports 
have distinct aesthetic aspects which are present in that form is a 
factor in evaluation. His "aesthetic" sports were gymnastics, ski-jump­
ing, figure-skating, high-diving and bull fighting. 
Munrow (1972) indicated that some sports, like skating, Olympic 
gymnastics, diving and trampolining, are hardly distinguishable from art 
forms. They form one end of a spectrum which reflects differences in 
evaluation procedures. At one end, aesthetic standards prevail and, at 
the other end of the spectrum of sports, objective scores, distances or 
speeds mark achievement. 
In most sports, according to Anthony (1968), any aesthetic element 
is incidental to the main aim of scoring goals or points. There are 
some sports, however, in which one major aim of the sport is aesthetic: 
to move artistically or gracefully. Variability among sports is found in 
differing sport purposes and some sports are more aesthetic than others 
if the aesthetic elements related to formal unity, intensity and com­
plexity are an integral part of their evaluation. 
Conclusion. Variability in the exhibition of the aesthetic-designa­
ting factors of unity, intensity and complexity seems to be a function 
of: the structure and aims of particular sports; the "game plan" and 
style and level of play of a particular contest; and the integration of 
the aesthetic factors into the evaluation procedures of particular 
sports. Variability is found from contest to contest and from sport to 
sport. 
Variability in the Visibility of 
Aesthetic-Designating Factors 
Variability in the visibility of aesthetic-designating factors is 
more a function of the selective perception of the spectator than of any 
other factor (Fisher, 1972; Best, 1975). Best indicated that while those 
sports which allow smooth and flowing movement in the achievement of 
their purpose seem to be generally considered and preferred as more aes­
thetic, the devotee of all sports can "see" beauty and grace in their 
sport. 
Renshaw (1975) posited that the sport activity can be perceived 
independent of the reason for its performance. For instance, a tennis 
serve can be regarded in terms of its functional aspects of power, speed 
and accuracy or in terms of the pure form of the movement. He then con­
cluded that "only the aesthetically aware spectator will perceive aes­
thetic quality in the player's performance" (p. 9). 
Similarily, Smith (1968) pointed out that perception is an integral 
ingredient of aesthetics and that "all human movement, for whatever pur­
pose it is performed, is intimately related to aesthetics" (p. 60). 
Since aesthetics is based on perception, to appreciate the 
beauty of the human body in motion one must make an effort 
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to "see" the form as well as the function of movement pat­
terns. By practice, however, the eye may be educated to 
take in more details of the patterns observed, and thus 
one's perceptual field is widened and one's discernment 
heightened (Smith, 1968, p. 62). 
The fact that the traditional measures of the quality of 
these events [sports] are minutes, seconds, feet, inches, 
and points should not distract us from an appreciation of 
the beauty of the movements themselves (Smith, 1968, p. 63). 
Keenan's (1972) viewpoint of variability of aesthetic-designating 
factors also, like Best (1975), Fisher (1972), Renshaw (1975) and Smith 
(1968), hinges on the selective perception of the spectator. He proposed 
that the spectator must have some understanding of aesthetic qualities to 
properly evaluate the artistry in a sporting performance. Prior movement 
experiences enable a spectator to fully perceive the artistry and "only 
the skilled recognize the extreme difficulty and fully appreciate the 
artistry of another's performance" (Keenan, 1972, p. 5). 
Conclusion. It can be concluded from these discussions that vari­
ability in the visibility of the aesthetic-designating factors is a func­
tion of the knowledge and background of the spectator in both aesthetics 
and in sport. The more one knows about the factors which contribute to 
the aesthetic in sport, the more one "sees" in sport performances. 
Central/Peripheral Nature of 
Aesthetic Qualities of Sport 
After considering the specific aesthetic-designating factors exhibit­
ed by sport, the centrality or peripherality of the aesthetic qualities 
of sport should be considered. Few authors have dealt with this issue 
and those who have done so devote very little time to the discussion. 
The philosopher, Reid (1970), categorically stated that: 
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The aesthetic qualities of games and sport are by-products 
--for the participants and even for the most aesthetically 
-minded observer, if he is really interested in sports or 
games as such. They can be an important and precious by- . 
product, but by-product they are none the less (p. 252). 
He proposed that sport is played to achieve the practical end or purpose 
of the sport and not generally to produce movement for aesthetic con­
templation. 
According to Reid (1970), aesthetic purposes are parasitic to most 
sports. However, in a discussion of the so-called "aesthetic" sports of 
gymnastics, skating and diving, Reid entertained the questions of 
"whether the production of aesthetic value is intrinsically part of the 
purpose of these sports" (1970, p. 258). 
Munrow (1972) argued for the teaching of aesthetic awareness of 
sports and games. Aesthetic awareness is a by-product, not end-product, 
of physical skill but such awareness is generally learned by practice 
rather than precept. His expressed concern was that aesthetic awareness, 
as a by-product of sport and game performances, is caught rather than 
taught. 
Anthony (1968) stated that "Most sports have the straightforward, 
uncomplicated objective of scoring goals or points; any esthetic element 
is incidental to the main aim" (p. 2). He did, however, mention that some 
sports, such as gymnastics, diving and skating, have one major aim which 
is aesthetic: the creation of "artistic" or "graceful" movement. The 
majority of sports are scored on what happens (points, goals, touches, 
etc.) rather than on how the actions are performed (rhythm, harmony and 
economy of effort). 
Another author who offered a similar distinction between "aesthetic" 
and "non-aesthetic" sports is Best (1975). He analyzed sports relative 
to the importance of the aesthetic. The importance of aesthetic con­
siderations of sport are, to Best, specific to the category of sport • 
being examined. Those sports where the aesthetic is relatively unimpor­
tant and, therefore, incidental, are designated as "purposive" sports. 
In each of these sports the aim, purpose, or end can be 
specified independently of the manner of achieving it as 
long as it conforms to the limits set by the rules or norms 
(Best, 1975, p. 43). 
The other category of sports include those activities in which the 
goal cannot be isolated from the aesthetic. In these sports, the how of 
performance is central rather than incidental. 
they are similar to the arts in that the purpose cannot be 
considered apart from the manner of achieving it. There is 
an intrinsic end, one which cannot be independent of the 
means (Best, 1975, p. 43). 
Best further proposed that the gap between these two categories of 
sport can be closed. The purpose and structure of the aesthetic sports 
can be examined and aesthetic considerations can be applied to sports of 
the purposive kind. 
Aesthetic sports have externally identifiable aims or purposes. 
There are rules and structures in all sports and "it is significant that 
there is no analogy in aesthetic sports with poetic justice" (Best, 1975, 
p. 44). Any deviation from the basic rule-specified requirements of a 
sport detract from the scoring and from the standards of the performance. 
However, in the aesthetic sports, the separation between the goal to be 
achieved and the manner of achievement is minimal. How the performer 
reached the goal is almost as important as the fact that the goal was 
reached. 
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Performances in purppsive sports can be aesthetically viewed. The 
economy and efficiency of effort, the rhythm, balance and harmony of 
movement can be examined. A purposive point of view would reward any way 
of winning, within the rules; aesthetic acclaim would be reserved for the 
sportsperson who achieved his purpose in an aesthetically pleasing way. 
The aesthetic pleasure which we derive from sporting events 
of the purposive kind, such as hurdling and putting the 
shot, is, then, derived from looking at, or performing, 
actions which we take to be approaching the ideal of total­
ly concise direction towards the required end of the partic­
ular activity (Best, 1975, pp. 45-46). 
It must be noted that successful achievement in both aesthetic and 
purposive sports presuppose attainment of the goal of the particular 
sport. 
Maximum aesthetic success still requires the attainment of 
the end, and the aesthetic in any degree requires direction 
to that end, but the number of ways of achieving such suc­
cess is reduced in comparison with the purely purposive in­
terest of simply accomplishing the end in an externally 
specifiable sense (Best, 1975, p. 44). 
Two authors, Kupfer (1975) and Kaelin (1968), are opposed to placing 
the aesthetic as peripheral to the nature of sport. Kupfer (1975) sug­
gested that the aesthetic is not external to the nature of the game but 
rather is the full realization of the sport. 
It seems to me that in no sport is the aesthetic subordinate 
to the "main purpose" since the purpose alluded to is part 
of the whole game, a reflection of excellence in the play 
of that game, and the aesthetic concerns the excellence of 
the whole (p. 86). 
Kaelin (1968) contended that the sport goals of conflict and op­
position of teams and/or individuals is central to the aesthetic aspects 
of sport. He indicated that the winning or losing of a game is aesthet­
ically irrelevant, but that the desire to win is always aesthetically 
relevant. 
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Controlled violence in which the opponent is not destroyed, 
but only defeated, and yet somehow morally edified--such is 
the essence of competitive sport. It reaches its aesthetic 
heights when the victor narrowly surpasses the worthy op­
ponent. . . . Sudden death play-offs--and perhaps extra-
inning games--are as close as a sport may come to achieving 
this aesthetic ideal (pp. 24-25). 
Kaelin, therefore, saw the aesthetic as being central to the "well-
played game." If the opponents are not well-matched in skill or if one 
team plays for a tie, the aesthetic and sport purposes are not met. The 
desire to win is an integral and necessary part of competitive sport. 
This opposition of strength in the will to win builds, sustains and 
releases dynamic tensions among both participants and observers. To 
Kaelin, the sport and aesthetic purposes of a contest do not have 
centra/peripheral relationship. If one is actualized, the other is 
realized also. They are interrelated and the failing to achieve one, 
negates the attainment of the other. 
Conclusion. The aesthetic is peripheral to the nature of sport if 
one defines the goal of sport as being independent of the manner of' 
achieving that end. When the "what" is seen as divorced from the "how" 
of achievement, the aesthetic is seen as an ancillary consideration. 
However, if one defines the sport purpose or goal in relation to the 
manner of achieving that end, then the aesthetic is a concommitant pur­
pose. The central/peripheral question is, therefore, answerable only in 
relation to how one defines both sport and the aesthetic. 
The definitions utilized in this paper lead to the conclusion that 
the aesthetic is central to the games-purpose of sport* The goals of 
sport and the manner of their achievement have been interpreted in rela­
tion to the aesthetic-designating factors of unity, intensity and 
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complexity. As Kaelin (1968) has indicated, the sport and aesthetic 
purposes of a contest are interrelated and the achievement of one brings 
about the achievement of the other. 
Conferred Status of Sport as Aesthetic Activity 
The next step in the establishment of the concept "aesthetic of 
sport" lies in an examination of the feasibility of conferring on sport 
the status of aesthetic activity. Sport has been found to display the 
aesthetic-designating factors of unity, intensity and complexity devel­
oped by Beardsley (1958) in his metacritical theory of Instrumentalism. 
The related Institutional aesthetic theory of Dickie (1974), because 
it was developed out of the basic precepts of Beardsley's Instrumentalism, 
offers the most logically consistent guidelines for designating sport as 
aesthetic activity. 
Dickie's aesthetic theory stressed the conventional matrix in which 
aesthetic objects and works of art are embedded and which define the 
essential characteristics of art. 
In order to verify statements about aesthetic objects we 
must already know what in general to look for and at, what 
to listen for and to, and so on (Dickie, 1974, p. 173). 
Dickie proposed that the aspects of an object or activity which 
designate the aesthetic aspects are determined by the conventions which 
govern presentation. Much of Dickie's explanation was concerned with 
identifying art objects rather than aesthetic objects or activity but the 
conventions described will help to define sport as aesthetic activity. 
The conventions of presentation which delineate aesthetic activity 
are intended to locate the aesthetic object for the spectator. The con­
ventions are specific to the activity and are characterized by the 
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essential properties and acceptable practices of that area. The conven­
tional matrix of a sport aesthetic, then, is determined by the display in 
sport of the aesthetic-designating factors which define aesthetic activity 
for this study. 
The aesthetic-designating factors have been identified as unity, 
intensity and complexity and the display in sport of these factors was 
discussed in detail earlier in this chapter. The exhibition in sport of 
the selected aesthetic-designating factors comprises the conventional 
matrix which defines an aesthetic of sport (see Table 2). 
Once the conventional matrix has been identified, the final step 
requires that an object or event "has had conferred upon it the status of 
candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of 
a certain social institution" (Dickie, 1974, p. 34). Dickie's designa­
tion of an art aesthetic was conferred on behalf of the "artworld" 
(Dickie, 1974; Danto, 1964). The artworld consists of a loosely organ­
ized association of artists, producers, audiences, reporters, critics, 
historians, theorists, etc. The minimum core of the artworld, the pre­
sentation group, includes the artists, the presenters and the goers. 
The application to sport is apparent. The conferring on sport of 
the status of aesthetic activity is done on behalf of the "sportworld." 
The sport situation or sportworld has been defined by Loy (1968) as being 
composed of: the primary (athletes), secondary (coaches, officials, 
trainers, managers) and tertiary (service personnel) producers; and the 
primary (active/"live" spectators), secondary (media spectators) and 
tertiary (those who talk or read about sport) consumers. Other personnel, 
not mentioned by Loy, are also important to the sportworld and should be 
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Table 2 
A Metacritical Aesthetic of Sport 
Aesthetic-designating 
Factor 
Display in Sport 
Unity 
spatial and temporal boundaries 
technical skill in performance—efficiency 
and economy of effort 
display and evaluation of formal design 
and expressive qualities 
harmony 
wholeness 
Intensity 
power, beauty and formal aesthetic factors 
displayed by the skilled human form in 
sport motion 
dynamic tensions formed by the flow of move­
ment and the spatial/temporal interrela­
tionships of bodies and body parts 
risk, virtuosity and originality displayed 
by the participants 
dynamic tension produced by the conflict 
and the opposition of wills to win 
dramatic and emotional responses to the 
action and the uncertainty of outcome 
Complexity 
range and diversity of sport activities 
dramatic aspects of sport 
many "viewpoints" from which sport can be 
examined 
ever-changing vista of sport situations 
uniqueness, novelty and spontaneity found 
in sport 
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added to its realm. This group would include the sport theorists, re­
porters, critics arid historians. The minimum core of the sportworld 
would include the athletes, the coaches and officials and the spectators. 
Without these individuals, the sportworld would not exist. 
Having defined the social institution, the sportworld, it remains 
to demonstrate how status is conferred by this institution. Dickie 
(1971, 1974) indicated that status may be acquired by a single person 
treating the activity as a candidate for appreciation. Therefore, a 
discussion of sport as aesthetic activity would be sufficient to desig­
nate it as such. Such discussions, once made public, carry a particular 
kind of responsibility: presenting sport as aesthetic activity always 
includes the possibility that no one else sees it as such and the person 
who did the conferring would thereby be seen in a less than favorable 
light. 
This has not happened with the sport aesthetic concept, though, for 
many sport theorists, who can be conceived of as acting on behalf of the 
sportworld, have designated sport as aesthetic activity. Some of the 
more succinct pronouncements are presented below as evidence of the con­
ferring on sport the status of aesthetic activity. 
Sport has aesthetic and thematic compulsion because expres­
sive modes of performing and contesting are significant and 
valued (Felshin, 1975, p. 31). 
The athlete in action is a perfect embodiment of all that 
is beautiful in art; not only beauty of movement, but beauty 
of intense vital movement—vigorous art. The struggle por­
trayed in the movement of the athlete's body, the working 
musculature, the captured action portrayed successfully in 
split seconds of "arrested movement," surpass any art crea­
tion produced by man (Pendergast, 1937, p. 70). 
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In the action and rhythm which testify to mastery of space 
and time, sport becomes akin to the arts which create 
beauty (Maheu, 1963, p. 32). 
The spectator, as well as the performer, will primarily 
respond to and acknowledge "the straight forward uncom­
plicated objective of scoring goals or points" but his ap­
preciation and enjoyment of the performance can be enhanced 
by his awareness of the aesthetics of the activity. In 
fact, because of the essentially different functions of 
performer and audience, it may well be that the onlooker 
sees more of the game in the aesthetic sense too (Munrow, 
1972, p. 100). 
The game itself considered as an aesthetic object is per­
ceived as a tense experience in which pressure is built up 
from moment to moment, sustained through continuous oppo­
sition, until the climax of victory or defeat (Kaelin, 
1968, p. 25). 
The most arresting aesthetic feature of sport _is the grace of 
the human form. Economy and efficiency of effort is accom­
plished in movement which is continuous and fluid: sport 
provides us distinct balletic values. . . . Aesthetic values 
also emerge from human interaction (Kupfer, 1975, p. 87). 
From the spectator's point of view, the aesthetic experience 
may come from any of three sources in sport—from the human 
form in action, from a single action, or from the action of 
the whole game at one moment (Fisher, 1972, p. 318). 
To discover the aesthetic in athletics is to be concerned 
with the action and movement of the medium, for athletics 
is necessarily process oriented (Keenan, 1972, p. 4). 
In this study, sport has been shown to exhibit the aesthetic-
designating factors which were defined by the selected metacritical 
aesthetic theories. The exhibition, visibility and centrality of these 
factors has also been examined and sport has, by the nature of the liter­
ature, been found to be properly designated as aesthetic activity (see 
Appendix C). 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study attempted to analyze and synthesize the concepts of meta-
critical aesthetics and sport and to utilize that philosophical base from 
•which to speculate on the nature of a metacritical aesthetic of sport. 
Gowin's method for the analysis of the structure of knowledge was 
used to identify the germinal issues in question form. The existence of 
a metacritical aesthetic of sport was explored and was found to be a 
viable concern. The answering of primary/telling questions and sec­
ondary/connecting subquestions supported the existence of the concept. 
Telling and Connecting Questions 
Telling Question: Is there an aesthetic of sport? 
Connecting Questions: What is aesthetics? 
What factors designate an object as a can­
didate for appreciation? 
Aesthetics is an axiologic subdiscipline of philosophy which con­
cerns itself with the nature and significance of art, with the evalua­
tion and value assessment of art objects and with the concept of "the 
beautiful." Aesthetic discourse attempts to clarify the basic concepts 
utilized in thinking and talking about the objects of aesthetic experi­
ence. 
A work of art or aesthetic experience involves three entities: a 
creator (artist), an object (event) and a perceiver (audience/critic) 
\ 
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(Hein, 1970). Various concepts of "What is aesthetics?" can be cate­
gorized relative to where they place the central focus of their concern: 
in the object, in the artist or in the perceiver. 
Formalism locates its central focus in the object. It proposes that 
the artist communicates in and through forms and contends that the audi­
ence enjoys the arrangements which combine formal elements into a unity. 
Formalism finds distinguishing features in the object itself rather than 
in the artist or in the attitudes of the audience. The essential object 
of the aesthetic analysis is the concrete work of art. 
Formalism, although it offers refuge from subjectivity and assures 
centrality of the object itself, tends toward ambiguity in the appraisal 
of the visual arts and makes the assumption that form can be discrim­
inated without awareness of the referent of the form. 
Those theories which focus on the artist are generally grouped 
within the rubric of Expressionism. One connotation of the term "expres­
sion" in relation to aesthetics sees art as the self-expression of the 
artist. Proponents claim that a work of art expresses the qualitative 
character of felt emotion. Expression consists of finding images to 
articulate an emotion and to make it determinate for apprehension. Art 
is excellent to the extent that it communicates experience. 
The artist-centered Expressionism theories do account for the emo­
tional quality of art and for the way art moves people but they are 
subject to the serious faults of confusing the intent of the artist and 
the reactions of the spectators with the properties of the work itself. 
When the central focus of aesthetic concern is found in the per­
ceiver, several theory-camps can be identified. Some Expression 
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theorists, dealing with the communication aspects of the art experience, 
contend that the artist attempts to communicate the basic forms of feel­
ings through the work of art. Attitude theorists define the aesthetic 
object in relation to the perceiver1s attitude toward it or approach to 
it. These theorists claim that there is some attitudinal position which 
the perceiver can assume which makes any perceived object into an aes­
thetic object. 
Perceiver-centered Expression and Attitude theorists make the audi­
ence an important participant in the aesthetic experience and highlight 
the psychological aspects of art appreciation and criticism. But these 
theorists, by making the perceiver so important, undermine the importance 
of the artist in the aesthetic process. 
All of the above-mentioned aesthetic theories are not particularly 
concerned with the evaluation and criticism of art, and yet, they arbi­
trarily make evaluative decisions about art and aesthetic objects. Meta-
criticism, which places its central focus in the perceiver, is more 
current than formal, expression and attitude theories. It was developed 
from the actual practices of critics and, as such, sees aesthetics as 
consisting of the principles which clarify and confirm critical state­
ments . 
Metacritical Instrumentalism, which is the basic philosophical aes­
thetic position utilized in this paper, attempts to isolate and describe 
the features of experience which are peculiarly characteristic of inter­
course with aesthetic objects (Beardsley, 1958). Critical reasoning 
about the arts presupposes general principles upon which judgments about 
particular works of art deductively depend. 
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Aesthetic experience is defined as the "immediate effect of aes­
thetic objects" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 559), and the primary principles or 
aesthetic-designating factors of metacriticism are unity, intensity and 
complexity. These factors are connected but independent and aesthetic 
experiences differ in magnitude as a function of these three variables. 
The aesthetic experience is coherent and complete (unity). It has 
continuity of development and an overall sense of pattern and coherence. 
All expectations and impulses which are aroused are counter-balanced or 
resolved by other elements within the experience. The experience is 
marked with intensity and a concentration of experience. The experience 
is composed of a sensory pattern of heterogeneous yet interrelated parts 
of a phenomenally objective field (complexity). Attention is totally 
focused, freely and without obstruction, on the experience itself. 
Metacritical Instrumentalism maintains that aesthetic experiences 
are distinctive and can be described utilizing the three aesthetic-
designating factors of unity, intensity and complexity as a basis for 
explanation. The categorizing of these three factors objectifies the 
explanation of the aesthetic experience. 
Connecting Questions: What is sport? 
What factors designate an activity as sport? 
The literature which attempts to define the nature of sport ap­
proaches the concept from three viewpoints: the organization and struc­
ture; the responses and involvement of the participants and spectators; 
and a combination of both structure and involvement. 
Some authors indicate that it is the structural and organizational 
aspects which allow sport activities to be identified as different from 
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other patterns of behavior. These definitional efforts see sport as 
involving skilled human patterns of play occurring within spatial, 
temporal and organizational limits. 
Other theorists focus attention on the responses and involvement of 
the performers and spectators. Structure and organization are not 
ignored, but these definitions contend that the interactional patterns 
of behavior are germinal to the meaning of sport. The physical, bodily 
nature of sport activities are assumed and these theorists then center 
their definitional efforts in the degree and kind of involvement among 
the individuals in the sport situations. 
The third focus or viewpoint attempts to combine the previously 
described emphasis, structure and involvement, to form more complex and 
encompassing definitions. These definitions, rather than splitting the 
focus between the two "centers," have broadened the central concepts to 
include both structural/organizational and interactional/involvement 
features. The complex and combinational definitions tend to be more 
effective in pinpointing "What is sport?" than the single-centered 
structural or interactional explanations. The common features of each 
single-centered focus are combined and expanded to allow the application 
of a composite definition to many differing sport activities. 
A consideration of the germinal aspects of the myriad of sport 
definitions explored in this paper produced the following definition 
of sport. 
Sport is physical, playful, bounded, rule-governed and com­
petitive/challenging activity. It offers opportunities for 
social interaction and for the pursuit of personal and group 
excellence. It is dynamic, tense, absorbing and potentially 
fulfilling. Sport is related to play, games and athletics. 
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This definition, hopefully, is narrow enough to exclude nonsport 
and broad enough to allow for the inclusion of the widely differing 
manifestations of the thing called sport. The word "sport" symbolizes 
a complexity which is regularly used to describe diverse game activities 
occurring on an almost unlimited number of skill and organizational 
levels. 
Telling Question: Can an aesthetic of sport be defined? 
Connecting Question: What aesthetic-designating factors are 
exhibited by sport? 
Metacritical Instrumentalism, the central aesthetic theory of this 
paper, defines aesthetic experience as the "immediate effect of aesthetic 
objects" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 559), and proposes three aesthetic-desig­
nating factors to identify the experience and the object: unity, inten­
sity and complexity. 
Unity. Coherence and completeness comprise the unity factor. 
Critical comments dealing with form, organization and the logic of 
structure and style are recognized as statements dealing with the unity 
of an aesthetic experience (Beardsley, 1958). 
The aesthetic-designating factor of unity is displayed in sport 
through spatial and temporal boundaries of performance; through technical 
skill in performance standards concerned with the efficiency and economy 
of effort; through the display and evaluation of formal design and expres­
sive qualities; and through the twin concepts of harmony and wholeness. 
Sport provides unity by being spatially immediate and temporally 
recurring. The total coordination of body and movement parts are funda­
mental to skilled execution and are basic to aesthetic appreciation 
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(Best, 1975). Well-executed movements, which display balance, rhythm, 
and economy of effort, yield great pleasure for the spectator (Smith, 
1968) . 
Form in sport is perceived as a sense of pattern and is described in 
both formal and expressive terms. Formal properties such as balance, 
symmetry and continuity are often linked with the more expressive de­
scriptors such as dynamic, strong and graceful (Reid, 1970). Every 
aspect of a sport contest is an integral part of the whole and harmony 
is displayed (Fisher, 1972). The aesthetic in movement occurs when the 
actual or empathic feel and the sport goal of the movement are in harmony 
(Munrow, 1972). Everything is focused on the achievement of the sport 
goal and useless motions, which do not contribute to the completion of 
movement skills, detract from the unity, wholeness and grace of the 
sport performance (Browne, 1917). 
Intensity. The intensity factor and its attendant concentration of 
experience are characterized by critical comments dealing with the force-
fulness, vividness, beauty and vitality of an experience. 
Sport is perceptually complex and intense (Roberts, 1975). When the 
focus is on the beauty of the human form in motion, the efficiency, grace, 
ease of skilled movement, rhythm, tension, flow and suppleness of the 
sport performance are critically examined (Fisher, 1972; Renshaw, 1975; 
Thomas, 1974). Also contributing to the intensity factor of sport are 
the dynamic flow of movement, the tensions, the spatial and temporal 
interrelationships among the bodies and body parts (Sandle, 1972). 
Risk, originality and virtuosity intensify the aesthetic experience 
both visually and experientially (Lowe, 1976). Sport builds up, sus­
tains, compounds and releases tension (Kaelin, 1968). Through conflicts, 
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collisions of intent, climaxes and Dionysian rituals, sport reveals 
itself as an extremely intense experience for both the performer and the 
spectator (Kitchin, 1966). 
Sport requires the total involvement of both spectators and partic­
ipants, thereby encompassing the whole range of human emotions. The 
drama and doubt over the final outcome provides dynamic tensions and 
emotional responses to sport display the full spectrum from joy and ex­
citement to sadness and despair (Pavlich, 1966). 
Complexity. The range and diversity of activities which are called 
sport contribute to the complexity of the concept. The dramatic aspects 
of sport, such as reversal or sudden changes of advantage during a con­
test and climaxes and personal styles of moving, offer diversity within 
the experience. "Sport translates simple themes into complex dimensions 
of style and, in so doing, provides dramatic satisfaction" (Felshin, 
1975, p. 31). 
The novelty, uniqueness and chaos of sport contribute to its per­
ceived complexity (Kostelanetz, 1973; Toynbee, 1972; Fisher, 1972). The 
sport situation, by its nature, is constantly shifting and changing and 
this necessitates invention, improvisation and experimentation on the 
part of the participants (Brown and Gaynor, 1967). 
Connecting Question: Is the exhibition of these factors central or 
peripheral to sport? 
The central/peripheral issue is concerned with the relative impor­
tance of the aesthetic to the nature of sport and is answerable only in 
relation to how sport and the aesthetic are defined. The relationship 
among sport and aesthetic means and ends must be examined to make a 
decision on this issue. 
110 
The aesthetic qualities of sport have been interpreted as peripheral 
or parasitic to the practical end or purpose of sport (Reid, 1970; 
Munrow, 1972). This viewpoint contends that the majority of sport activ­
ities are scored on what happens rather than on how the actions are 
performed (Anthony, 1968) and, therefore, the aesthetic is seen as 
ancillary. 
Best (1975) modified this viewpoint to offer that the central/ 
peripheral issue was specific to the nature of the sport being considered. 
In some activities, the achievement of the sport goal can be considered 
independently from the manner in which the goal was reached. In these 
sports, the aesthetic is peripheral and of only secondary importance. 
When the "how" of performance is intrinsic to the achievement of the 
sport goal, the aesthetic is primary and central. 
The position offered by Kaelin (1968) and Kupfer (1975) is consist­
ent with the definitions of sport and aesthetics utilized in this paper. 
These authors suggested that the aesthetic is not external to the nature 
of sport but, instead, is the full realization of the sport goal. The 
aesthetic is seen as concommitant if one defines the sport purpose/goal 
in relation to the manner of achieving it. 
The goals of sport and the manner of achieving those goals have been 
interpreted in this paper in relation to the aesthetic-designating 
factors of unity, intensity and complexity. The sport and aesthetic 
purposes of a contest are interrelated and interdependent and the failing 
to achieve one, negates the attainment of the other. 
Telling Question: Can sport be classified relative to the aesthetic? 
Connecting Questions: Is there variability in the exhibition of 
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aesthetic-designating factors? 
Is there variability in the visibility of 
these factors? 
The issue of variability in the exhibition of the aesthetic-desig­
nating factors of unity, intensity and complexity is discussed in the 
literature examined from three points of view: all sport is aesthetic; 
variability is found from sport to sport; variability is seen from con­
test to contest among all sports. 
Kupfer (1975) and Keenan (1972) argued that all sport is beautiful 
and that all sports have aesthetic elements. The display of economy and 
efficiency of effort, the tensions and intensity of human interactions, 
the rhythm and the drama of opposition of wills to win which occurs in 
all sport is indicative of the centrality of the aesthetic to the nature 
of sport. 
Browne (1917), Gaskin and Hasterson (1974), Jeu (1972), Kaelin 
(1968) and Toynbee (1972) proposed that the variability to be found 
occurs from contest to contest. The aesthetic is seen as specific to 
particular performances rather than to particular sports. The elements 
of composition and structure (unity), rhythm and harmony (unity and com­
plexity) , empathy (intensity) and tension and color (intensity) are 
unique and different for each sport performance. Since opposition and 
tension are factors related to the aesthetic in sport, any variability 
in these elements would produce aesthetic variability. Contests in which 
teams or individuals are mismatched and contests in which one side "gives 
up" before the final action are examples of "less aesthetic" performances 
when compared to those contests in which the tension and doubt over the 
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final outcome are sustained to the final second of play. 
Aesthetic variability has also been proposed to be a function of the 
structure, history and ritual and evaluation phases of sport. Brown and 
Gaynor (1967) saw differences among sports in the potential for spontaneous 
improvisation and creativity. The structure of some sports offers few 
action-alternatives for the participants. The opportunities for indi­
vidual action and group interaction are generally greatest in team sports 
with group creativity being influenced by three factors: the combining of 
individual creativity; team interaction; and game structure. 
If one agrees with Geblewicz (1965) that the spectacle of sport 
contributes to the aesthetic considerations, then variability sport to 
sport is assumed. The rules, history and traditions of sports vary and 
some sports dictate the presence of the more spectacular elements of 
rituals and ceremonies, parades of participants, fanfares and elaborate 
cos turning. 
Variability was found by Best (1975) and Renshaw (1975) to be a 
function of the means/end relationship found among sports. Those sports 
in which there is a very close relationship between the sport goal and 
the means of achieving it are designated aesthetic. In most sports the 
end is more important than the manner of reaching it and, therefore, the 
aesthetic is incidental. 
Variability within sport is found in differing sport purposes. Some 
sports are more aesthetic than others because the aesthetic-designating 
elements of unity, intensity and complexity are an integral part of their 
evaluation phases (Lowe, 1977; Munrow, 1972; Reid, 1970; Anthony, 1968). 
If objective scores, distances or speeds mark achievement, then the 
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aesthetic is not as important as in those sports in which aesthetic 
standards prevail. 
The visibility of the aesthetic-designating factors also produces 
variability among sports and among contests. The selective perception of 
the spectator seems to be the major factor here. Smith (1968), Keenan 
(1972), Fisher (1972), Renshaw (1975) and Best (1975) agree that vari­
ability in the visibility of the aesthetic-designating factors is a 
function of the knowledge and background of the spectator in both aes­
thetics and in sport. 
Variability in the exhibition and visibility of the aesthetic-
designating factors of unity, intensity and complexity is found from 
sport to sport and from contest to contest. Variability seems to be a 
function of the structure and aims of particular sports, the style and 
level of play of particular contests and the integration of the aesthetic 
factors into the evaluation procedures of particular sports. The more 
understanding a spectator or participant has concerning the nature of 
aesthetic qualities and how they contribute to the aesthetic in sport, 
the more one is able to "see" and properly evaluate in sport performances. 
Telling Question: Can a paradigm be formulated for an aesthetic of 
sport? 
In an attempt to clarify and symbolize the interaction of sport and 
the metacritical aesthetic-designating factors of unity, intensity and 
complexity, a model was designed. This paradigm should help to con­
ceptualize and better visualize the metacritical aesthetic. Pictures of 
the model are presented as Figures 1, 2 and 3. 
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Figure 1 
Model, view 1 
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Figure 2 
Model, view 2 
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Figure 3 
Model, view 3 
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Wood was chosen as the medium for the model for several reasons. 
The author had been recently working in wood and, therefore, was able to 
clearly visualize a design solution in that medium. The supplies, tools 
and technical assistance were readily available. Most importantly, the 
texture, grain design and natural color tones of wood seemed to be proper 
for the development of the model. Wood tones, being somewhat neutral, 
eliminated the potential problem of connotations associated with color. 
Basswood, which is also called Linden Wood (Tilia heterophylla), was 
chosen as the type of wood because it is soft and easily worked and be­
cause it exhibits a distinct grain pattern. The size of the model was 
dictated by the size of available material. A larger model might show 
the inner designs more clearly. 
The ultimate design of the model was actualized through sketching 
and clay modeling. Design ideas were initially sketched and then worked 
in clay. This preliminary work saved valuable carving material and 
allowed the design ideas to be tried out to see if they had potential. 
Once a satisfactory sketch and clay figure were designed, the wood model 
was created. 
The model was conceived and is designed to be viewed synoptically, 
not discursively. Osborne (1955) defined discursive seeing as switching 
attention rapidly from one section of the field to another and, there­
fore, the field is apprehended by comparing and putting together the 
parts which are attended to separately. In synoptic seeing, the field 
enters into awareness in a single act of evenly distributed attention. 
The discussion will, by necessity, isolate various design features in a 
discursive fashion but does so only to justify thesymbolizations. The 
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whole model should be viewed as an entirety to fully realize its intended 
meaning. 
The explanation of design symbolization related formal design 
features (line and shape) to the three metacritical aesthetic-designating 
factors. Curvilinear paths, rather than rectilinear designs, were chosen 
to suggest the flow and flexibility of the interactions of unity, inten­
sity and complexity within sport. The potential complexity and variety 
of the interactional possibilities among the three factors necessitated 
suggesting these relationships rather than trying to depict them as they 
might occur. 
Sport is symbolized as an ellipsoid. The curved shape seemed con­
sistent with the overall intent to show flow, flexibility and energy in 
the model. 
The aesthetic-designating factors of unity, intensity and complexity 
are presented as curved channels within the ellipsoidal model of sport. 
Each of these tubular passages intersects with the other channels at a 
variety of angles. The intersection of the factor paths was designed to 
reflect the unpredictable interactional effects of the elements. Were 
these interactions mathematically predictable and precise, a more tra­
ditional geometic design might have been utilized. The variability in 
channel length, size and intersecting angles is intended to suggest the 
range and diversity in the possible interactions of the factors. 
Each hole in the ellipsoid of sport was created to represent the 
threefold metacritical aesthetic of sport and to allow carving access to 
the aesthetic pathways. They are shaped to suggest the flow of energy 
within sport. No attempt is made to specifically identify each entrance 
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as being unity, complexity or intensity. Variations in the shapes was 
intended to show the potential variability in the exhibition and visi­
bility among the three factors rather than to depict each factor as it 
occurs within sport. Critical aesthetic judgments utilize many differing 
criteria of value and "there is no set of rules that says that one of the 
three . . . is to be weighted higher than the others" (Beardsley, 1958, 
p. 538). These aesthetic-designating factors are interconnected yet 
independent and aesthetic experiences differ in magnitude as a function 
of the three variables. 
The interactions among the factor pathways occur towards the center 
of the model to indicate the centrality of aesthetics to sport. The 
sport and aesthetic purposes of a contest are integrated and the achieve­
ment of one brings about the attainment of the other. 
The decision to cut the design loose from its base was made to allow 
the model to be turned and examined from many different viewpoints and 
perspectives. This was done to give the viewer an awareness of the com­
plexity and variability to be found in the metacritical aesthetic of 
sport. A different wood, mahogany, was utilized for the base to assure 
that the model would be seen as independent from its display pedestal. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
1. Inspection of the concept, aesthetic of sport, should be attempt­
ed from other philosophical aesthetic positions such as formalism, ex­
pressionism and attitude theory. 
2. A more definitive analysis of variability among and within 
sports in the exhibition and visibility of the metacritical aesthetic-
designating factors should be attempted. 
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3. A semantic analysis of the metacritical aesthetic of sport 
should be devised experimentally. The utilization of bi-polar adjectives 
associated with the aesthetic-designating factors identified should be 
utilized to locate the concept in semantic space. 
4. Analysis of specific sport forms such as football, baseball, 
tennis and gymnastics should be made utilizing the metacritical aes­
thetic-designating factors of unity, intensity and complexity. 
5. The metacritical aesthetic of sport should be examined and 
analyzed more specifically from the performer's point of view. 
6. A pedagogical model should be developed to assist in the 
presentation of metacritical aesthetic of sport appreciation. 
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S tructural/Organizational Definitions 
Anthropological 
Metheny 
Suits 
Loy (institutional game) 
Loy (social institution) 
sport is organized play involving two 
plus sides which has rules, patterns 
of play and criteria to determine a 
winner. 
sport is a diverse set of activities 
or organizations of human behavior. 
sport is a game which involves skill 
and which has a fairly stable, wide 
following. 
sport is defined in relation to its 
degree of organization. 
the sport order is comprised of all 
organizations which assist or reg­
ulate human action in sport situa­
tions . 
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Interactional Definitions 
Huizinga (play) play is free, voluntary, intense and 
absorbing; it has rules, order and 
boundaries. 
Caillois (game) game is defined in relation to the 
attitudes of the players with compe­
tition, chance, simulation and 
vertigo being designed as the four 
main rubrics. 
Luschen 
Loy (social situation) 
Dunning 
Mcintosh 
Jeu 
Slusher 
sport is interactional activity which 
is both rational and playful. 
sport in a social context is defined 
in relation to the degree and kind of 
interactional involvement among the 
individuals in the sport situation. 
the function of sport is to provide a 
pleasurable tension-excitement 
through a group configuration. 
sport is classified in relation to 
the motives and satisfactions which 
sport gives. 
sport is both physically and emotion­
ally exertive; it is free, competi­
tive and fulfilling. 
sport is serious and is centered 
around the physical body and is com­
munal; Being is both the object and 
goal of man's involvement in sport. 
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Complex/Combinational Definitions 
Weiss sport is a rule-governed bodily ad­
venture which has boundaries, strat­
egies and tactics; man engages in 
sport to seek excellence and comple­
tion of self. 
Kenyon 
Loy (game occurrence) 
Torkildsen 
Vanderzwaag 
Kent 
sport is gross physical activity 
which is both institutionalized and 
competitive. 
sport is playful, free, uncertain, 
unproductive and rule-governed; it 
is highly organized with traditions, 
a past and guidelines for the future. 
sport is both an institution in 
society and a domain of human 
activity. 
sport is an extension of play which 
is ruled, competitive and includes 
the demonstration of physical 
prowess. 
sport is a pattern of game which 
includes the elements of play and 
games; it has a history and a pre­
scribed system of physical, goal-
oriented actions. 
Singer 
Wulk 
sport is activity with administrative 
organization and rules to define and 
limit human behavior; it involves 
competition or challenge and physical 
skill primarily determines the out­
come. 
sport is physical, playful, bounded, 
rule-governed, competitive activity 
offering opportunities for social 
interaction and the pursuit of excel­
lence; it is dynamic, tense, absorb­
ing and potentially fulfilling. 
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Formalism 
Theory 
Proponent(s) 
Essence of art 
Apprehended 
Purpose of art 
Value of art 
Criteria of good art 
Significant form 
Clive Bell 
significant form 
discursively 
escapist--to go 
beyond or out of 
real life 
Organic unity 
Harold Osborne 
organic unity 
synoptically 
vitality and enhanced 
awareness— to become 
more alive 
intrinsic value resides in aesthetic apprecia­
tion as a self-rewarding activity—an individual 
work of art is said to have aesthetic value in­
sofar as it evokes and sustains aesthetic con­
templation and the aesthetic experience. 
that which displays 
significant form 
through relational 
configurations of line 
and color thereby, 
evoking the aesthetic 
emotion 
that which displays 
organic unity through 
relational configura­
tions of complex ele­
ments, expressive in 
character and embodied 
in a sensuous medium 
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theory 
Proponent(s) 
Essence of art 
Apprehended 
Purpose of art 
Value of art 
Criteria of good art 
Expressionism 
Intuition and 
Imaginative expression 
Benedetto Croce 
R. G. Collingwood 
self-expression of the 
artist—as process 
synoptically 
to express felt emo­
tion of the artist 
clarifies feeling 
successfully expresses 
emotion intended by 
the artist 
Symbolic 
Transformation 
Suzanne Langer 
embodiment of emotion 
in an art object—as 
communication 
synoptically 
creates specific 
forms which are 
symbolic of specific 
human feelings 
expands and enriches 
experience 
successfully expresses 
the desired human 
feeling(s) through 
the symbolic trans­
formation of its 
structural properties 
Attitude Theory 
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Theory 
Proponent(s) 
Essence of art 
Apprehended 
Purpose of art 
Value of art 
Criteria of 
good art 
Psychical 
distance 
Disinterested 
attention 
Edward Bullough M. J. Stolnitz 
"Seeing as" 
Virgil Aldrich 
experiencing of a special aesthetic attitude to the 
presence of an object 
synoptically synoptically synoptically 
promote the experiencing of an aesthetic attitude 
expands and enriches experience 
that -which is successfully perceived in a special 
aesthetic attitude way: 
psychical dis­
tance 
disinterested 
attention 
"seeing as" 
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Metacriticism 
Theory 
Proponent(s) 
Essence of art 
Instrumentalism 
Monroe Beardsley 
causation of aesthetic 
experience of fairly 
great magnitude—having 
unity, intensity and 
complexity 
Institutionalism 
George Dickie 
artifacts with con­
ferred status are 
experienced within a 
conventional matrix 
defined in behalf of 
the art world 
Apprehended 
Purpose of art 
discursively discursively 
as a means to produce aesthetic experiences 
which are valuable in themselves 
Value of art contact with works of art potentially causes 
aesthetic experiences 
aesthetic experiences have the capacity to: 
relieve tension and quiet destructive impulses; 
promote personal integration; increase sensi­
tivity and perception; and expand imaginative 
responses and creativity 
Criteria of good art successfully causes has an "inner life" 
and enters into aes- by being embedded in 
thetic experience an institutional/ 
conventional matrix 
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A Metacritical Aesthetic of Sport 
General 
terra 
Aesthetic-designating 
factors 
Examples of critical 
comments Display in sport 
Unity 
c ohe renc^^^^s^ 
completeness 
well-organized or 
disorganized 
formally perfect or 
imperfect 
has or lacks inner 
logic of struc­
ture and style 
spatial and temporal boundaries 
technical skill in performance—efficiency 
and economy of effort 
display and evaluation of formal design and 
expressive qualities 
harmony and wholeness 
Magnitude 
Intensity and 
concentration 
of experience 
full of vitality or 
insipid 
forceful and vivid 
or weak and pale 
beautiful or ugly 
tender, tragic, 
ironic 
graceful, delicate 
richly comic 
power, beauty and formal aesthetic factors 
displayed by the skilled human form in 
sport motion 
dynamic tensions formed by the flow of move­
ment and the spatial/temporal interrela­
tionships of bodies and body parts 
risk, virtuosity and originality displayed by 
the participants 
dynamic tension produced by the conflict and 
the opposition of wills to win 
dramatic and emotional responses to the 
action and the uncertainty of outcome 
Complexity 
range diversity 
of elements 
developed on a 
large scale 
rich in contrasts 
or lacks variety 
and repetitive 
subtle and imagina­
tive or crude 
range and diversity of sport activities 
dramatic aspects of sport 
many "viewpoints" from which sport can be 
examined 
ever-changing vista of sport situations 
uniqueness, novelty and spontaneity found in 
sport 
